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ABSTRACT 
The community-driven development (CDD) approach has become increasingly popular because of its 
potential to develop projects that are sustainable, are responsive to local priorities, empower local 
communities, and more effectively target poor and vulnerable groups. The purpose of this study is to 
assess the impacts of Fadama II, which is a CDD project and the largest agricultural project in Nigeria. 
This study used propensity score matching (PSM) to select 1728 comparable project beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries. The study also used double difference methods to compare the impact indicators.  
Our results show that Fadama II project succeeded in targeting the poor and women farmers in its 
productive asset acquisition component. Participation in the project also increased the income of 
beneficiaries by about 60 percent, which is well above the targeted increase of only 20 percent in the six 
year period of the project.   
Regarding rural infrastructure investments, we found that the Fadama II project had positive near-
term impacts on beneficiaries’ access to markets and transportation costs, although the study revealed 
surprising effects on beneficiaries’ commercial behavior and statistically insignificant impacts on 
nonfarm activities.  
We also observed that Fadama II increased the demand for postharvest handling technologies but 
did not have a significant impact on the demand for financial management and market information. 
Fadama II reduced the demand for soil fertility management technologies. The decline likely reflects the 
project’s focus on providing postproduction advisory services and suggests the need for the project to 
increase its support for soil fertility management and thus limit the potential for land degradation resulting 
from increased agricultural productivity. Overall, the Fadama II project has achieved its goal of increasing 
the incomes of the beneficiaries in the first year of its operation. The project has also succeeded in 
targeting the poor and vulnerable in its productive-asset component, even though that did not appear to 
increase significantly short-term household incomes among the poorest asset tercile. The unique feature 
that could have contributed to the significant impact of the project in a short time is its broad-based 
approach, which addresses the major constraints limiting the success of CDD projects that address only 
one or two constraints. This has implications on planning poverty reduction efforts in low-income 
countries. Given that the poor face numerous constraints, a CDD project that simultaneously addresses 
many constraints will likely build synergies that will lead to larger impacts than will a project that 
addresses only one or two constraints. This suggests the need for the government and donors to pool 
resources and initiate multipronged CDD projects rather than many isolated projects.  
Keywords: community driven development, poverty reduction, propensity score matching, 
difference-in-difference, Fadama, and Nigeria. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The community-driven development (CDD) approach has become a key strategy used by both 
government and development assistance programs (Gillespie, 2004; Mansuri and Rao, 2004; Platteau, 
2004). The popularity of the CDD approach has been propelled by its potential to develop projects and 
programs that are sustainable and responsive to local priorities, empower local communities to manage 
and govern their own development programs, and more effectively target poor and vulnerable groups 
(Dongier et al., 2001; Gillespie, 2004). Empirical evidence of the effectiveness of CDD in achieving these 
objectives is mixed (Mansuri and Rao, 2004). Among the interesting questions capturing the attention of 
scholars are the sustainability of donor-supported CDD and its effectiveness in targeting the poor and 
vulnerable. Khwaja (2001) observed that projects managed by communities were more sustainable than 
those managed by local governments because of better maintenance. However, Cleaver (1999), Kleimeer 
(2000), and Mosse (1997) found that CDD projects that lacked external institutional, financial, and 
technical support were not sustainable.  
Targeting the poor has been one of the challenges of development and emergency response 
programs (Farrington and Slater, 2006). One argument in favor of CDD asserts that it can improve 
targeting because CDD projects make better use of local knowledge to define and identify the targeted 
groups (Mansuri and Rao, 2004). However, empirical evidence is mixed concerning the effectiveness of 
targeting using the CDD approach. One review concluded that in heterogeneous communities with high 
social inequality, the performance of CDD projects in targeting has been worse than that of externally 
managed programs (Conning and Kevane, 2002). However, the review also revealed that in egalitarian 
communities with open and transparent systems of decision making, targeting was better with CDD than 
with development approaches using external project management.  
This study was conducted to assess the impact of a CDD project called Fadama II, which is the 
largest agricultural project in Nigeria. The Fadama II project aims to reduce poverty by supporting 
communities to acquire infrastructure and productive assets, providing demand-driven advisory services, 
increasing the capacity of communities to manage economic activities, and reducing conflicts among 
resource users. This report evaluates the impact of the project on income poverty,
1 access to infrastructure 
and productive assets, and provision of demand-driven advisory services. It does not evaluate how the 
project affected the capacity to resolve conflicts among users of Fadama resources and the capacity of 
beneficiaries to manage CDD projects.
2 In this report, we also examine whether the project succeeded in 
targeting the poor and the vulnerable through its poverty reduction efforts and productive asset 
acquisitions. 
Section 2 of the report discusses the CDD approach and how the Fadama II project applied it in 
its design and implementation. Section 3 provides a brief review of the initial accomplishments of the 
project identified by the medium-term review (MTR) and discusses what our study contributes beyond the 
MTR. The fourth section discusses the methods of data collection and analysis used in the study. Section 
5 reports the initial impacts of Fadama II on productive asset acquisition, rural infrastructure 
development, and household income; and Section 6 assesses the project’s effects on demand for and use 
of advisory services. The last section draws conclusions and discusses the policy implications of the study 
findings, with an emphasis on strategies that can be used to ensure sustainability of similar projects and 
improve targeting to the poor and vulnerable.  
                                                      
1   Income poverty is the most common measure of poverty. It uses income as the indicator of poverty. For example, 
people with income of less than US$1 a day per capita are regarded as poor by many studies and reports (e.g., see World Bank, 
2007).  
2   Fadama is a Hausa word for low-lying flood plains, usually with easily accessible shallow groundwater. Fadama are 
typically waterlogged during the rainy season but retain moisture during the dry season. These areas are considered to have high 
potential for economic development through appropriate investments in infrastructure, household assets, and technical assistance. 
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2.  BACKGROUND AND APPROACH OF THE FADAMA II PROJECT  
2.1. Background 
Fadama II is a follow-up to Fadama I (phase I of the National Fadama Development Project), which was 
implemented during the period 1993–1999.
3 Fadama I focused mainly on crop production and largely 
neglected support of postproduction activities such as commodity processing, storage, and marketing. The 
emphasis of Fadama I was on providing boreholes and pumps to crop farmers through simple credit 
arrangements aimed at boosting aggregate crop output. Fadama I worked with Fadama User Associations, 
which the states used mainly to recover loans and to decide on water infrastructure locations.  
The design of Fadama I did not support rural infrastructure development and did not consider 
other resource users such as livestock producers, fisherfolk, pastoralists, and hunters, among others. The 
focus on crop producers contributed to increased conflicts among the users of fadama resources. 
Increased crop production increased the surplus, but the project did not support postharvest technology, 
contributing to reduced crop prices and increased storage losses.  
Fadama II was first implemented in 2005 and operates in 12 states, 9 of which were Fadama I 
states (Bauchi, Kebbi, Niger, Benue, Taraba, the Federal Capital Territory [FCT], Ogun, Oyo, and 
Lagos).
4 Fadama II seeks to address the shortcomings of Fadama I by shifting from a top-down and 
supply-driven public sector development program to the community-driven development approach. 
Fadama II also includes other fadama resource users that the first project had ignored. As discussed in the 
following section, Fadama II also supports activities and services other than production. 
2.2. Community-Driven Development Approach of Fadama II 
CDD is a development approach that empowers local people and local governments to participate in the 
decision making, control, and management of development programs (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007; 
Dongier et al., 2001). The approach differs from programs and projects that treat beneficiaries as passive 
aid recipients (Labonne et al., 2007). Most CDD projects focusing on poverty reduction have five main 
features (Dongier et al., 2001; Dasgupta and Beard, 2007; Labonne et al. 2007):  
1.  Empowerment of the local communities and local governments: CDD projects are designed to 
empower local communities and local governments to participate in decision making and 
management of development programs, to negotiate with institutions and service providers on 
the planning and implementation of development programs, and to hold services providers 
accountable.  
2.  Demand driven design: CDD projects reflect the needs of local communities and 
governments, allowing them to determine what types of development activities and resource 
allocations the project should include to make it effective for them 
3.  Social inclusion: Not all CDD projects involve the poor, women, youth, and other vulnerable 
groups. For example, CDD projects that target commercially oriented farmers do not include 
poor subsistence farmers. However, CDD projects that focus on poverty reduction make 
deliberate efforts to include the poor and vulnerable because they are most prone to poverty.  
4.  Collective action: Because they are community based, CDD projects are designed to be 
implemented collectively through communities or local governments rather than individuals 
(Binswanger and Aiyar, 2003; Dasgupta and Beard, 2007). CDD beneficiaries collectively 
plan and implement project activities, budget, and other resource allocation decisions. CDD 
projects are also supported by public funding from central governments or donors that 
support the communities or local governments. However, CDD projects are not likely to 
                                                      
3 Fadama I operated in 25 states, of which 9 are also covered by Fadama II. The Fadama I states were Bauchi, Jigawa, Kano, 
Kebbi, and Sokoto in the North; Kogi, Niger, Plateau, Benue, Taraba, and the Federal Capital Territory in the Middle Belt; and 
Ogun, Oyo, Osun, Ondo, Lagos, Edo, Delta, Anambra, Enugu, Imo, Abia, Rivers, Cross Rivers, and Akwa Ibom in the South.  
4 We discuss the implications of Fadama I and Fadama II sharing the same states in the methods section.   3
succeed if they include several communities or involve beneficiaries with significant 
inequalities in income and other measures of poverty (Dongier et al., 2001; Labonne et al., 
2007).  
5.  Support from external institutions and organizations: As already mentioned, CDD projects 
receive support from governments and donors. This is one of the main characteristics that 
differentiate the CDD approach from the methods used by community-based organizations 
(CBOs), which may not receive external support.
5 The support that CDD projects receive 
include strengthening the ability of beneficiaries to plan, implement, and manage 
development programs; to facilitate access to services that support the relevant development 
programs; and to strengthen the link with formal institutions and organizations (e.g., CBOs, 
nongovernmental organizations, traders, etc.; Dongier et al., 2001).  
The design of the Fadama II project meets all the key features of a CDD project. Consistent with 
the CDD approach, project activities are centered on Fadama User Groups (FUGs) and Fadama 
Community Associations (FCAs). An FUG comprises fadama users with a common economic interest 
and is therefore a type of economic interest group. FCAs are the associations of FUGs operating in a 
given area. Each FCA designs and oversees the implementation of a Local Development Plan, which is 
the blueprint of the Fadama II the development project in that FCA. The major productive sectors that 
Fadama II supports include crops, livestock, agroforestry, fishing, and fish farming (fisherfolk). 
Addressing one of the weaknesses of Fadama I, Fadama II also supports postproduction activities that are 
closely linked to the project’s productive activities. These include agroprocessing enterprises and rural 
marketing service providers. As part of its targeting strategies, Fadama II provides special preferences to 
groups of youth, women (especially widows), physically challenged persons, the elderly, and people with 
HIV/AIDS. Targeted groups can belong to any of the productive or service sectors supported by the 
project. Because the Fadama II uses the CDD approach, beneficiaries are given the chance to choose the 
kind of activities they want to pursue. However, there are some activities that the project does not support, 
such as activities that could lead to degradation of natural resources or large-scale changes in land use 
(NFDO, 2005). Under the CDD approach of Fadama II, all users of Fadama resources are encouraged to 
develop participatory and socially inclusive local development plans.  
The 12 states benefiting under the World Bank–assisted aspects of Fadama II are Adamawa, 
Bauchi, Gombe, FCT, Imo, Kaduna, Kebbi, Lagos, Niger, Ogun, Oyo, and Taraba.
6 Fadama II was 
designed to operate for six years (2004–2010) with a goal of contributing to poverty reduction in Nigeria. 
Actual implementation did not begin until September 2005, however. The project set a target of 50 
percent of male and female Fadama resource users who benefit from the project-supported activities 
achieving an increase in average real income by at least 20 percent compared with the baseline. 
The project designed the following five components to achieve its targets: 
1.  Rural infrastructure investment to support creation of economic infrastructure and local 
public goods that would improve the productivity of households using Fadama resources. 
Under this component, beneficiaries are required to pay 10 percent of the costs of 
constructing rural infrastructure, including rural roads, culverts, market stalls, cold storage, 
boreholes, and irrigation infrastructure, among others. 
2.  Pilot productive asset acquisition support to enhance the improvements in the productivity 
and income Fadama resource users by facilitating the acquisition of productive assets by 
individuals or FUGs. Under this component, Fadama resource users are required to pay 30 
percent of the cost of the productive assets acquired. 
                                                      
5 A CBO is a locally organized and managed formal or informal group that requires membership and whose members have a 
common interest (Dongier et al., 2001). Nongovernmental organizations do not require membership but are required to be 
formally registered and may not have beneficiaries (Dongier et al., 2001; Jagger and Pender, 2006). CDD projects usually work 
with existing relevant CBOs. For example, Fadama II required its beneficiaries to be members of Fadama User Groups. If 
relevant CBOs do not exist, CDD projects help to build the capacity to form CBOs (Dongier et al., 2001). 
6   An additional six states are benefiting under a version of the project supported by the African Development Bank.   4
3.  Demand-responsive advisory services to support advisory services that will enable Fadama 
resource users to adopt output-enhancing techniques and more profitable marketing practices 
in their enterprises. 
4.  Capacity building to increase the ability of its beneficiaries to assess their needs, participate 
in planning, and implement and manage economic activities, and to increase the capacity of 
the project coordinators to conduct monitoring and evaluation. Fadama II provides capacity 
building through trained facilitators. In addition, FUG members are trained to negotiate and 
manage contracts and to conduct basic financial analysis. 
5.  Conflict resolution to address the shortcoming of Fadama I by increasing the capacity of 
FUGs to manage conflicts, which were particularly serious and more frequent between 
pastoralists and crop farmers. More than 98 percent of conflicts among Fadama resource 
users involved pastoralists and farmers (Schoen et al., 2002). The project set an objective of 
reducing the number of conflicts by 50 percent by 2010.  
Because we evaluated the progress of the project and its income impacts after only one full year 
of implementation, this study should not be considered a final impact assessment of Fadama II. Rather, it 
is a quantitative assessment of initial progress and impacts after one year of implementation, and a 
potentially useful baseline against which to measure future progress and impacts.   5
3.  PAST STUDIES ON THE EFFECTS OF FADAMA II 
This section describes the progress of Fadama II implementation based mainly on the medium-term 
review (MTR) completed in May 2007 (Anonymous, 2007a). Although the MTR assessed many aspects 
of the implementation of the Fadama II project, here we focus on the outcomes we analyzed in our study. 
3.1. Advisory Services 
The Fadama II project has implemented a pluralistic advisory service in which both private and public 
entities provide services and funds. Advisory service providers are largely private, with only 5 percent of 
the services offered by public providers. However, funding of the advisory services is mainly public, with 
project beneficiaries paying 10 percent of the cost and the project paying 90 percent. Thus, the Fadama II 
project has formed a foundation for developing demand-driven advisory services using a pluralistic 
approach, which is an important step in establishing sustainable demand-driven advisory services.  
The MTR report states that the advisory service component achieved most of its objectives, 
although it is not clear how the achievements were measured. For example, the report states that 1,700 
advisory services were provided to 1,026 FUGs. However, that achievement affected only 12 percent of 
the 8,577 FUGs. It is not clear why about 88 percent of the FUGs did not receive advisory services. The 
MTR also observed collusion between advisory service providers and FCA/FUG officials. This has 
compromised the independent recruitment of providers and serves as one example of elite capture in CCD 
projects in developing countries (Mansuri and Rao, 2004). 
3.2. Pilot Productive Asset Acquisition Support 
According to the MTR, the pilot asset acquisition (PAA) component was readily accepted by 
beneficiaries because they obtained tangible near-term benefits from the project, whereas with other 
components, like infrastructure development, capacity building, or advisory services, the impacts are not 
as readily felt or seen. A total of 7,511 subprojects were undertaken in the PAA component, representing 
67 percent of the subprojects undertaken in all components of Fadama II. At the time of the MTR, at least 
67 percent of all PAA subprojects under the local development plans had been completed and 27 percent 
were ongoing. Thus, 94 percent of PAA subprojects have been funded and almost completed, indicating a 
high demand for this component by Fadama resource users and rapid achievement of the outputs of this 
component. In Section 5.2, we quantify the value of productive assets acquired and measure the impact of 
Fadama II on productive asset acquisition across several comparison groups. 
3.3. Rural Infrastructure 
At the time of the MTR, 2,817 rural infrastructure projects had been initiated, 63 percent of which were 
completed. This significant achievement is likely a result of the large amount of matching funds paid by 
the project (90 percent), a level that certainly contributed to the fast acceptance and implementation of the 
rural-infrastructure component. An important issue is the sustainability of the component after the project 
ends. The commitment of beneficiary communities to adequately maintaining the infrastructure using 
their own resources is not yet clear but might have been undermined by such a large matching 
contribution from the project. Also, the 90 percent matching contribution provided by the project will be 
costly to replicate in other areas.  
3.4. Contribution of this Study  
In general, the MTR report indicates that the accomplishments of the Fadama II project have been 
positive in all components except monitoring and evaluation, which was rated as marginally satisfactory. 
However, the MTR did not quantify the impacts of the project on community or household wealth and   6
income, or other expected outcomes of the project. Also, the approach used in the MTR did not control 
for factors outside the project that could affect outcomes. The major contribution of this study is its 
approach of investigating counterfactual nonproject communities and households as well as project 
beneficiaries, allowing better attribution of the outcomes to the project. This contribution is important to 
evaluating not only the Fadama II project but also the many other impact studies of projects conducted 
without using comparison groups (Mansuri and Rao, 2004).  
This study uses quasi-experimental and econometric methods to control for other factors that 
could affect project outcomes. The main focus of the study is on quantifying the impacts of the project on 
poverty reduction, which is the major objective of Fadama II. We do this by examining the impact of 
Fadama II on acquisition of productive assets, income, rural infrastructure, and advisory services. The 
analysis in this report is based on the household survey only.
7  
                                                      
7 Other reports analyze particular impacts or components of Fadama II, including impacts on conflict reduction, capacity 
building, communication and advisory services, and rural infrastructure (Arokoyo, 2007; Gbenga, 2007; Yahaya, 2007). The 
reports on advisory services and rural infrastructure do not use the survey data used in this study but rather use secondary data 
and primary data collected by different methods.    7
4.  METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
4.1. Study Area 
This study was conducted in all 12 states benefiting from the Fadama II project. As shown in Figure 1, the 
12 states lie in three major agro-ecological zones (Maziya-Dixon et al., 2004): the humid forest (Lagos, 
Ogun, and Imo); moist savannah (Adamawa, FCT, Oyo, and Taraba); and dry savannah (Bauchi, Gombe, 
Kaduna, Kebbi, and Niger). In each benefiting state, the project was implemented in 10 selected local 
government areas (LGAs).  
Figure 1. Map of Nigeria showing Fadama II states (FII) 
 
4.2. Sample Selection 
4.2.1. Household Survey 
To analyze the impact of the Fadama II project on beneficiaries and the spillover of benefits to 
nonparticipants living in Fadama II communities, we divided the sampling frame into three strata: (1) 
direct project participants, (2) respondents living in Fadama II communities but not directly participating 
in the project (although they might benefit indirectly), and (3) respondents living in communities in 
Fadama resource areas outside the Fadama II LGAs but with socioeconomic and biophysical 
characteristics comparable to the Fadama II communities and in the same state. We expected 
nonbeneficiaries living in communities with a Fadama II project to be affected by spillover from some 
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project benefits, such as construction of rural infrastructure and provision of advisory services. For 
example, project participants living in a Fadama II community that built a culvert could use the same road 
to transport their produce, and information about new technologies provided by the Fadama II advisory 
services might be shared with nonparticipants.  
This stratification was designed to allow for estimation of the direct and indirect effects of 
Fadama II. By comparing project outcomes for direct beneficiaries with outcomes for similar (in terms of 
initial productive asset endowments, education, etc.) nonparticipating households in the same 
communities, we obtained an estimate of the direct impacts of Fadama II participation. Because 
nonparticipating households in the Fadama II communities may have benefited from spillover effects, this 
comparison does not provide an estimate of the full impact of the project. Comparing Fadama II 
beneficiaries to similar households in similar communities not included in the project provides a better 
estimate of the total impact of the project on beneficiaries (assuming that spillovers are not affecting 
households in the communities outside the project), while comparing nonparticipants in Fadama II 
communities with similar households in communities outside the project provides an estimate of the 
impact of spillover effects on nonparticipants in project communities.  
As with Fadama I, selection of states to participate in Fadama II was not random. The 12 Fadama 
II states and the local Fadama resource areas where the project operated were purposely selected by the 
government of Nigeria in collaboration with the World Bank.
8 Purposive sampling is common with many 
government-funded programs in developing countries (Duflo et al., 2006). This introduces a selection bias 
and weakens the external validity of our results. Most of the states selected were in the humid and dry 
savannah zones. As previously stated, 9 of the 12 states also participated in the Fadama I project. Fadama 
II did not give special preference to or bias against Fadama I beneficiaries. However, former Fadama I 
beneficiaries might have derived an advantage because of their membership in Fadama User Associations 
(FUAs). Each Fadama II beneficiary is required to be a member of an FUG, which can be based on an 
FUA formed under Fadama I. This could have introduced some selection bias in sampling Fadama II 
beneficiaries in the sense that FUA members in the 9 Fadama I states were more likely to be Fadama II 
beneficiaries and thus more likely to be sampled than were non-FUA members.
9 
At the LGA level, the sampling procedure involved randomly picking 4 LGAs from among the 10 
in each state participating in Fadama II. One FCA was randomly selected from each of the 4 LGAs, and 
then 25 households were randomly selected from each FCA. This approach was designed to result in a 
sample size of 100 households for each household type (direct project beneficiaries, nonbeneficiaries 
living within Fadama II LGAs, and households outside Fadama II LGAs) in each state, for a total sample 
of 3,600 households. However, as shown in Table 1, some field teams randomly sampled more than 25 
households per FCA but used the same approach used for the planned sample, resulting in a total sample 
size of 3,750 households. The sampling frame for the Fadama II FCA was stratified to ensure that all 14 
FUGs supported by the project (where they existed in the sample FCA) were included in the list.
10 The 
sampling frame of the household survey was also stratified by the gender of the respondent, ensuring that 
a quarter of the respondents from each FCA were female.  
Selection of nonbeneficiaries living within and outside Fadama II LGAs followed the same 
procedure as just described. However, the FUG listed depended on the availability of economic interest 
groups comparable to those in the Fadama II. Similarly, 25 percent of the sample consisted of female 
respondents.  
                                                      
8 The project planners did not take randomization into account when designing the project. This is common in many projects 
in developing countries (Duflo et al., 2006). This study was initiated about a year after the project started, so had no ability to 
influence the design of the project.  
9 The double-difference estimator that we used in the impact evaluation helps to address the impacts of such differences in 
initial conditions by differencing out any additive fixed effects of such differences but does not completely solve the potential 
problem of selection bias because the impacts of Fadama II may interact with participation in Fadama I. These issues are 
discussed further in Section 4.5. 
10 The 14 FUGs were crop farmers, fisherfolk, pastoralists, livestock farmers, hunters, gatherers, agroforesters, 
agroprocessors, service providers, elderly persons, widows, people living with HIV/AIDS, unemployed youths, and physically 
challenged persons.   9
Table 1. Planned and realized household sampling 
Sample size (number of households)  Household type 
Planned Actual 
1,200 1,281  FII beneficiaries 
  
1,200 1,240  Nonbeneficiaries within FII LGAs 
  
1,200 1,229  Nonbeneficiaries outside FII LGAs 
  
Total 3,600  3,750 
Note: FII = Fadama II; LGA = local government area. 
4.2.2. Community Survey 
The main aim of the community-level survey was to discuss community organizations, rural 
infrastructure, and conflicts over resource use. The sampling procedure of communities followed closely 
the household-level approach. However, only two strata were used: Fadama II and non–Fadama II 
communities. It was not feasible to establish the spillover effects by selecting communities in the 
neighborhood of Fadama II communities (as in the household survey sample) because some FCAs 
covered more than one village. Respondent groups among the Fadama II beneficiaries were chosen from a 
randomly selected group of 10 to 25 individuals who did not participate in the household survey. The 
individuals were selected from the four FCAs sampled in the household survey. The selected individuals 
were then separated into two focus groups for the first three LGAs and in four focus groups in the fourth 
LGA. This formed a total of 10 discussion groups. The same procedure was used to select groups from 
the non–Fadama II communities; that is, the same LGAs selected for the household survey were used to 
select 10 groups of Fadama resource users who do not benefit from the Fadama II project. The economic 
interest groups selected were closely related to those supported by Fadama II project. However, finding 
those groups was difficult because the economic interest groups in non–Fadama II communities are 
generally not well organized.  
4.3. Survey Instruments and Data Collection  
A structured survey instrument was used for the household survey. The community survey was 
semistructured because it included both structured questions and discussion guidelines. Structured 
questions were used to determine the extent of conflict resolution among Fadama resource users and 
changes in rural infrastructure. Guidelines were used to direct qualitative discussions about what factors 
led to conflict resolution and infrastructure changes, how they have affected livelihoods in the 
community, and what needs to be done in future. Each of these instruments was developed through a 
series of meetings, discussions, and pre-testing. In each state, the state team leader was responsible for the 
administration of each type of survey instrument. However, the interviews were carried out by trained 
enumerators under the supervision of group team leaders. In each state, group team leaders reported to the 
state team leader at the end of each survey day.  
4.4. Collecting Baseline Data 
The double-difference analysis used in this study (explained further in the next section) requires baseline 
data of good quality. Because the baseline survey for Fadama II had some deficiencies (Faye and 
Sutherland, 2006), we collected baseline data for Fadama II using recall information. The project was 
implemented in September 2005, only slightly more than a year before the survey was conducted; 
therefore, we expected respondents to be able to remember the baseline data required for two years before   10
the survey—that is, for the crop years October 2004 to September 2005 (2004–2005) and October 2005 to 
September 2006 (2005–2006). This recall information included data on household composition and size, 
major productive assets, and major components of household income. Household respondents had no 
difficulty recalling changes in household composition, size, or major productive assets since October 
2004, while recall of income components posed some difficulties. However, because income was not used 
as an explanatory variable in the analysis (unlike prior household composition and assets) but only as a 
dependent variable, the potential for measurement error in that variable was of less concern, although it 
increased uncertainty and reduced the statistical power of the estimates.
11  
4.5. Data Analysis 
Impact assessment studies face three interrelated challenges: establishing a viable counterfactual (the 
predicted outcome in the absence of the intervention—that is, what would have happened to the 
beneficiaries had they not participated in the project); attributing the impact to an intervention; and coping 
with long and unpredictable lag times (Alston and Pardey, 2001; Salter and Martin, 2001). If a project’s 
outcome indicator is household income, the average impact of the project on its beneficiaries (referred to 
in the impact assessment literature as the average effect of the treatment on the treated [ATT]) is defined 
as the difference between the expected income earned by project beneficiaries while participating in the 
project and the expected income they would have received if they had not participated in the project:  
  ATT = E(Y1|p = 1) – E(Y0|p = 1)  (1) 
where ATT = average impact of treatment on the treated; p = participation in the project (p = 1 if 
participated in the project, and p = 0 if did not participate in the project); Y1 = outcome (household 
income, in this example) of the project beneficiary after participation in project; Y0 = outcome (income) of 
the same beneficiary if he or she had not participated in the project.  
Unfortunately, we cannot observe the counterfactual income of the beneficiaries had they not 
participated in the project—E(Y0|p = 1). Simply comparing incomes of households participating in the 
project with those not participating could result in serious biases, because the two groups may be quite 
different and thus likely to have different incomes regardless of their participation in the project. For 
example, adding and subtracting E(Y0|p = 0) on the right side of equation (1) results in the following: 
  ATT = [E(Y1|p = 1) – (E(Y0|p = 0)] – [E(Y0|p = 1) – (E(Y0|p = 0)]  (2) 
The first expression (within the first set of square brackets) is observable because it is the 
difference between the incomes of the beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries. The second expression is 
unobservable because E(Y0|p = 1) is unobservable and thus represents the bias resulting from estimating 
ATT as the first expression. This bias results because the incomes that nonbeneficiaries receive without 
the project may not be equal to the incomes that beneficiaries would have received without the project; 
that is, E(Y0|p = 1) may not equal E(Y0|p = 0).  
Two common sources of bias are (1) project placement or targeting bias, in which the location or 
target population of the project is not random (e.g., some subprojects of Fadama II are targeted to the poor 
and vulnerable so that wealthier groups do not have an equal chance of participating), and (2) self-
selection bias, in which households choose whether or not to participate and thus may be different in their 
experiences, endowments, and abilities.
12 The most accepted method to address these biases is to use an 
experimental approach to construct an estimate of the counterfactual situation by randomly assigning 
                                                      
11 In econometric analysis, measurement error in a dependent variable increases the uncertainty of the estimates but causes 
no bias as long as the error is not correlated with the explanatory variables, whereas measurement error in an explanatory variable 
does cause a bias (Greene, 2003). We believe that similar principles apply to the results of propensity score matching, the quasi-
experimental approach used in this study, although we have not seen specific articles on this issue in the relatively recent 
literature on propensity score matching. 
12 For example, a pastoralist in the state of Niger reported that he did not want to participate in Fadama II because similar 
projects in the past had failed.    11
households to treatment (beneficiary) and control (nonbeneficiary) groups. Random assignment ensures 
that both groups are statistically similar (i.e., drawn from the same distribution) in both observable and 
unobservable characteristics, thus avoiding project placement and self-selection biases. Such an approach 
is not feasible in the present study because project placement and participation decisions were already 
made before the design of the study and probably were not random. The notion of random assignment 
also conflicts with the nature of this CDD project, in which communities and households make their own 
decisions about whether to participate and what activities they will pursue, thus limiting the ability to use 
this approach even from the outset. 
Various quasi-experimental and nonexperimental methods have been used to address the bias 
problem (for details, see Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd, 1998; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 
1998; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; and Smith and Todd, 2001). One of the most commonly used quasi-
experimental methods is propensity score matching (PSM), which selects project beneficiaries and 
nonbeneficiaries who are as similar as possible in terms of observable characteristics expected to affect 
project participation as well as outcomes.
13 The difference in outcomes between the two matched groups 
can be interpreted as the impact of the project on the beneficiaries (Smith and Todd, 2001). We used this 
method to estimate the ATT for impacts of the Fadama II project on household productive assets, 
incomes, and indicators of access to rural infrastructure and impacts of this.  
The PSM method matches project beneficiaries with comparable nonbeneficiaries using a 
propensity score, which is the estimated probability of being included in the project. Only beneficiaries 
and nonbeneficiaries with comparable propensity scores are used to estimate the ATT. Those who do not 
have comparable propensity scores are dropped from the comparison groups. In our study, 1,728 of 3,758 
observations matched. Therefore, we used only the matched observations to analyze the impact of 
Fadama II.  
Among the advantages of PSM over econometric regression methods is that it compares only 
comparable observations and does not rely on parametric assumptions to identify the impacts of projects. 
However, PSM is subject to the problem of “selection on unobservables,” meaning that the beneficiary 
and comparison groups may differ in unobservable characteristics, even though they are matched in terms 
of observable characteristics (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd, 1998). Econometric regression 
methods devised to address this problem suffer from the problems previously noted. The bias resulting 
from comparing noncomparable observations can be much larger than the bias resulting from selection on 
unobservables, although they could not say whether that conclusion holds in general (Heckman, Ichimura, 
Smith, and Todd, 1998).  
In this study, we address the problem of selection on unobservables by combining PSM with the 
use of the double-difference (DD) estimator.
14 The double-difference estimator compares changes in 
outcome measures (i.e., change from before to after the project) between project participants and 
nonparticipants, rather than simply comparing outcome levels at one point in time. 
  DD = (Yp1 – Yp0) – (Ynp1 – Ynp0) (3) 
where Yp1 = outcome (e.g., income) of beneficiaries after the project started; Yp0 = outcome of 
beneficiaries before the project started; Ynp1 = outcome of nonbeneficiaries after the project started; and 
Ynp0 = outcome of nonbeneficiaries before the project started. 
The advantage of the double-difference estimator is that it nets out the effects of any additive 
factors (whether observable or unobservable) that have fixed (time-invariant) impacts on the outcome 
indicator (such as the abilities of farmers or the inherent quality of natural resources), or that reflect 
common trends affecting project participants and nonparticipants equally (such as changes in prices or 
weather; Ravallion, 2005). Thus, for example, if project participants and nonparticipants are different in 
their asset endowments (mostly observable) or in their abilities (mostly unobservable), and if those 
                                                      
13 This method is referred to as “quasi-experimental” because it seeks to mimic the approach of experiments in identifying 
similar “treatment” and “control” groups. However, because the comparison groups identified in PSM are not selected by random 
assignment, they may differ in unobserved characteristics, even though they are matched in terms of observable characteristics.  
14 The double-difference method is also known as the difference-in-difference method (Duflo et al., 2004).   12
differences have an additive and fixed effect on outcomes during the period studied, such differences will 
have no confounding effect on the estimated ATT.  
In principle, the double-difference approach can be used to assess project impacts without using 
PSM and will produce unbiased estimates of impact as long as these assumptions hold. However, if the 
project has differential impacts on people with different levels of wealth or other observable 
characteristics, the simple double-difference estimator will produce biased estimates if participant and 
nonparticipant households differ in those characteristics (Ravallion, 2005). By combining PSM with the 
double-difference estimator, controls for differences in pre-project observable characteristics can be 
established. A bias could still result from the heterogeneous or time-variant impacts of the unobservable 
differences between participants and nonparticipants. For example, communities and households that 
participated in Fadama I may have different responses to Fadama II than those that did not because of the 
cumulative effects of social capital developed under Fadama I, favorable or adverse experiences under 
Fadama I, or other factors.
15 Such shortcomings are unfortunately inherent in all nonexperimental 
methods of impact assessment (Duflo et al., 2006). Although no solution to these potential problems is 
perfect, we believe the method we have used addresses these issues as well as possible in this case. 
The standard errors estimated by the double-difference method may be inconsistent because of 
serial correlation or other causes of a lack of independence among the errors. In ordinary regression 
models, serial correlation can result from unobserved fixed effects, but by taking first differences, the 
double-difference method eliminates that source of serial correlation. However, serial correlation still may 
be a problem if more than two years of panel data are used (Duflo et al., 2004). In our study, because we 
used only two periods, before and after the project, we do not have a concern about serial correlation 
among multiple periods. Another reason for the possible nonindependence of the errors is clustering of 
the sample. 
The propensity scores were computed using binary probit regression models. We estimated three 
probit models for three comparisons: (1) Fadama II beneficiaries compared with all nonbeneficiaries, (2) 
Fadama II beneficiaries compared with nonbeneficiaries within Fadama II communities, and (3) Fadama 
II beneficiaries compared with nonbeneficiaries outside Fadama II communities. The dependent variable 
in each model is a binary variable indicating whether the household was a beneficiary of the Fadama II 
project.  
The explanatory variables used in computing the propensity scores are those expected to jointly 
determine the probability to participate in the project and the outcome. We focused on the determinants of 
income and productive assets when selecting the independent variables for computing the principle score 
matching. We assumed that rural infrastructure should be included in productive assets. These variables 
are summarized in Table 2.  
                                                      
15 Unfortunately, we did not collect information on respondents’ participation in Fadama I and thus could not try to test or 
control directly for such effects.   13
Table 2. Variables used to compute propensity scores and their expected signs 
Variable   Expected 
impact on 
participation 






Gender of respondent 
(female = 1, male = 0) 
+  Fadama II had special 
subprojects targeted to 
women groups 
–  Women are usually poorer 
than men  
Household size  +  Larger families could be 
associated with poverty or 
other vulnerability that 
qualifies for Fadama II 
support 
–  The larger the family, the 
poorer  
Age of respondent   +/–  Project supported both the 
elderly and youth 
+  Older respondents likely to be 
better off than young ones 
because of accumulation of 
wealth and experience over 
the life cycle 
Level of education of 
respondent (years of 
formal education) 
+ Some  project 
requirements need certain 
level of education
1  
+  Education increases income 
opportunities, such as on-farm 
activities 
Area of rainfed land 
(ha) 
+/– Wealthier  households 
more likely to join 
Fadama project because 
of their ability to pay the 
beneficiary contribution; 
however, the project also 
supported the poor 
+  More land enables households 
to invest more and get higher 
income and more productive 
assets 
Agro-ecological zone 
(compared with humid 
forest)  
   Moist savannah 
??  Unknown  –  Humid forest zone closer to 
major cities and has higher 
agro-ecological potential 
   Dry savannah  ??  Unknown  –  Same as above 
Distance to nearest 
town (km) before 
project started 
+  Requirement for bank 
account gives advantage 
to people living closer to 
roads and towns where 
banks always operate 
+  Access to market increases 
income opportunities and 
reduces transaction costs 
Distance to nearest all-
weather road (km) 
before project 
+  Same as above  +  Same as above 
Value of productive 
assets (Naira) before 
project 
+  Same as for land area  +  Same as for land area 
Value of livestock 
before project 
+  Same as for land area  +  Same as for land area 
1 For example, FUGs qualifying for Fadama II support were required to have a bank account, a requirement that calls for a certain 
degree of education. 
The results of the probit models are reported in the appendix. We found that Fadama II 
beneficiaries are more likely to be female and to have larger households than nonbeneficiaries (both 
within and outside Fadama II LGAs). Compared with nonparticipants within Fadama II communities, 
Fadama II participants also tend to be older. By contrast, participants tend to be younger and have more 
land but reside further from an all-weather road compared with nonparticipants outside Fadama II 
communities. These results suggest that the Fadama II project is targeted to vulnerable groups such as 
women, larger households, and people in more-remote locations, although apparently the project also   14
targets communities with larger-sized farms and is not targeted in terms of other factors, such as 
education, ownership of productive assets or livestock, or agro-ecological zone.  
These probit model results were used to compute the propensity scores that were used in the PSM 
estimation of ATT. Several methods are possible for selecting matching observations (Smith and Todd, 
2001). We used the kernel matching method (using the normal density kernel), which uses a weighted 
average of “neighbors” (within a given range in terms of the propensity score) of a particular observation 
to compute matching observations. Unlike the nearest-neighbor method, using a weighted average 
improves the efficiency of the estimator (Smith and Todd, 2001). Observations outside the common range 
of propensity scores for both groups (i.e., lacking “common support”) were dropped from the analysis. 
This requirement of common support eliminated about half of the total number of observations, indicating 
that many of the observations from the various strata were not comparable.  
Further testing of the comparability of the selected groups was done using a “balancing test” 
(Dehejia and Wahba, 2002), which tests for statistically significant differences in the means of the 
explanatory variables used in the probit models between the matched groups of Fadama II participants 
and nonparticipants. In all cases, that test showed statistically insignificant differences in observable 
characteristics between the matched groups (but not between the unmatched samples), supporting the 
contention that the PSM ensures the comparability of the comparison groups (at least in terms of 
observable characteristics). 
We used bootstrapping to compute the standard errors of the estimated ATT, generating robust 
standard errors because the matching procedure matched control households to treatment households 
“with replacement” (see Abadie and Imbens, 2002 and 2006, on the use of bootstrapping for inference in 
matching estimators).  
Using the matched samples, we also analyzed the impact of Fadama II on demand for advisory 
services. In that analysis, we compared the type and rate of adoption of production and postproduction 
technologies of Fadama II beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries. We also asked the respondents using each 
technology whether they asked for that technology. We then compared the type of technologies demanded 
by Fadama II beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries.   15
5.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1. Major Sources of Income 
Table 3 shows that crop production was a major source of income for all types of respondents before and 
after the Fadama II project started. The enterprise contributed more than 46 percent to the incomes of both 
beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries before and after the Fadama II project. The contribution of crop 
production to household income had increased one year after the project for all types of respondents, but 
the change was especially large (more than 10 percent) for the Fadama II beneficiaries and 
nonbeneficiaries outside Fadama II communities. For the Fadama II beneficiaries, the increase in the 
contribution of crops to household income could have resulted from the acquisition of productive assets 
that helped to add value (e.g., agroprocessing equipment) or increase productivity (e.g. irrigation). This is 
a reflection of the Fadama II focus on agriculture-based subprojects. Because Fadama II is a CDD project, 
the change also reflects the beneficiaries’ demand for agricultural equipment and advisory services that 
led to increases in crop production. The factors contributing to the change in the contribution of crops to 
the household incomes of respondents outside Fadama II communities remain unclear.  
Nonfarm activities contributed the second-largest share of household income before and after the 
project. The contribution of nonfarm activities to household income decreased for both the Fadama II 
beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries living in communities not participating in the Fadama II project. This 
reflects the increase in contribution of the crops for those types of respondents. The Fadama II project 
supported both agricultural and nonfarm activities. The decrease in the contribution of nonfarm activities 
for Fadama II beneficiaries suggests that most chose to develop crop production and/or value addition for 
crops rather than participate in nonfarm activities. What is interesting is the low contribution of some 
activities that Fadama II supports. Beekeeping, hunting, gathering wild products, fish farming, and 
pastoral livelihoods are among the activities the project encourages but did not contribute significantly to 
household income. Because the project is a CDD, the limited contribution of those activities suggests that 
few beneficiaries demanded them.  
Table 3. Sources of income for Fadama II beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries. 
% contribution to total income  
before project (Oct. 2004 to Sept. 2005) 
% contribution to total income  













Crop  production  46.60  53.80  46.90 56.80 56.50  60.20 
Nonfarm 
activities 
48.50  38.70  43.30 41.10 39.90  39.30 
Livestock 
production 
4.90  7.43  9.70 2.10 3.50  0.05 
Other activities   0.00  0.13  0.19  0.00  0.14  0.54 
Note: FII = Fadama II; LGA = local government area. 
5.2. Impact of Fadama II on Pilot Asset Acquisition 
Pilot asset acquisition is the second largest investment in the Fadama II project, after rural infrastructure 
investments (World Bank, 2003). Because Fadama II supported productive asset acquisition by FUGs 
rather than individual households, we divided the productive assets into those owned by individual 
farmers and those owned jointly by economic interest groups. It was not easy to determine the share of 
value that each member of a group held in jointly owned productive assets. The intensity of use of the 
productive assets also differed across households within groups. For example, members of an economic 
interest group owning a borehole for watering animals used the equipment not according to how much 
they contributed but according to their needs as determined by the number of animals they owned. Our   16
data collection focused on the household-level assets and did not capture the group-level management of 
productive assets. 
Figures 2 and 3 show that the Fadama II project had a large and statistically significant impact on 
the value of productive assets owned by groups and individuals benefiting from the project compared 
with nonbeneficiaries. In all comparisons reported in Table 4, Fadama II beneficiaries saw the value of 
group-owned productive assets increase significantly (at a statistical significance level of p = .01) across 
all agro-ecological zones (except the dry savannah, where the increase was significant only at p = .10), 
asset terciles, and genders. The poorest tercile of beneficiaries (in terms of value of assets owned before 
the project) experienced the largest increase of group-owned productive assets (both in absolute and 
percentage terms): an average increase of 91,780 percent (from only Naira 482 to 470,865).
16 The reason 
for this massive increase is that ownership of group productive assets was relatively small for those 
beneficiaries before the project.
17 The large increase in the value of jointly owned productive assets 
includes the value of the cash transfer (70 percent of the total productive asset value) from the project to 
the beneficiaries.  
The most common FUG productive assets acquired were water and irrigation equipment, which 
118 (24 percent) of 489 Fadama II households acquired (Table 5). The value of FUG water and irrigation 
equipment increased by 2,771 percent, from Naira 47,475 before the project to Naira 1,362,937 by 
September 2006, highlighting the large impact that the Fadama II project had on the value of productive 
assets. Further, privately owned water and irrigation assets more than doubled in value over the same 
period. Likewise, total values of processing equipment, livestock, and building structures owned by FUGs 
more than doubled. The large increases for individual productive asset types add up to a large increase in 
the total value of productive assets, especially for beneficiaries in the poorest asset tercile, who had few 
productive assets before the project. 
The increase in value of productive assets among the upper asset tercile was only 63 percent. The 
value of productive assets owned by women’s economic interest groups participating in the project also 
increased significantly compared with the value of productive assets belonging to women’s groups not 
participating in the project. These results demonstrate that the pilot asset acquisition component 
succeeded in its efforts to target poor and vulnerable groups.  
Compared with all nonbeneficiaries and with nonbeneficiaries within and outside Fadama II 
communities, project beneficiaries experienced greater increases in the value of privately owned 
productive assets as a result of participating in the project. Comparisons between the dry savannah and 
the moist savannah and between male beneficiaries and male nonbeneficiaries also showed significantly 
greater increases in the value of private productive assets for beneficiaries. However, the increase in the 
value of productive assets was generally less for privately owned productive assets than for those owned 
by economic interest groups. That is because Fadama II supports asset acquisition through economic 
interest groups rather than individual Fadama users (NFDO, 2005). Even though Fadama II did not 
support individuals in purchasing productive assets, FUG members were able to acquire such productive 
assets through their groups. The individual acquiring the private productive asset would pay the entire 
beneficiary contribution in the name of the FUG. Fadama II did not interfere with the private ownership 
of productive assets, which could explain the significant increase in the value of privately owned 
productive assets for beneficiaries. Another possible explanation is that FUG members were required to 
buy complementary inputs to support the jointly owned productive assets. For example, FUG members 
owning irrigation equipment may have needed to buy pesticide sprayers to grow irrigated vegetables. The 
                                                      
16 This increment is not a simple difference between the before and after values. Rather, it is an increase that takes into 
account the changes of the control group, such as ATT/value of assets of beneficiary before the project. These values are all in 
real (deflated to 2003) values. 
17 However, the pre-project level of group assets was significantly larger for Fadama II beneficiaries than for 
nonbeneficiaries. This might reflect actual differences resulting from a greater tendency of Fadama II beneficiaries to have 
participated in group activities before the Fadama II project, or it might reflect a reporting error concerning when group assets 
were acquired by Fadama II beneficiaries (i.e., some Fadama II respondents may have mistakenly reported some of the group 
assets that they acquired under Fadama II as group assets owned before the project). If the latter case is true (overreporting of 
initial group assets by Fadama II beneficiaries), then the impacts of Fadama II on the acquisition of group assets are 
underestimated, and the total effects would be even larger than the estimated effects.   17
statistically insignificant impact of participation in the project on privately owned productive assets for 
beneficiaries in the poorest asset tercile and for female beneficiaries suggests that the poor and vulnerable 
were not able to finance both the privately owned productive assets and the beneficiary contribution of 
group productive assets. However, the estimated magnitude of the mean impacts for these groups was 
positive and large (128 percent increase for the poorest asset tercile and 32 percent for women), even 
though these estimates were not statistically significant. Therefore, the statistical insignificance of the 
estimates does not prove that the impacts were nonexistent; rather, it indicates that the variances of the 
subsample impacts were too large to measure with the sample size we had. 
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Notes: FII = Fadama II. The ATT and the corresponding percentage refer to the change in productive assets resulting from 
participation in Fadama II compared with the corresponding group of nonbeneficiaries. Thus, they should not be interpreted as 
referring to the change in productive assets of the corresponding control group of nonbeneficiaries. 
LGA = Local Government Area   18













































ATT ('000 Naira) % change due to participation in FII
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change in productive assets of the corresponding control group of nonbeneficiaries. 
LGA = Local Government Area   19
Table 4. Value of productive assets before and after Fadama II across agro-ecological zones, 
genders, and asset terciles. 
Treatment type  Value of individually owned assets (Naira)  Value of group-owned assets (Naira) 
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Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations of the corresponding mean. 
1 “Before project” is one year before Fadama II started, October 2004 to September 2005, and “After project” is one year after the 
project started, October 2005 to September 2006. 
2 “ATT” and the corresponding “%” refer to the change in productive assets resulting from participation in Fadama II compared 
with the corresponding group of nonbeneficiaries. Thus, they should not be interpreted as referring to the change in the 
productive assets of the corresponding control group of nonbeneficiaries. 
* Significant at the 10% level; 
** significant at the 5% level; 
*** significant at the 1% level   20
Table 5. Value of productive assets for Fadama II beneficiaries on matched sample. 
Type of asset  Value of group-owned productive assets 
(Naira) 
Value of individually owned 
productive assets (Naira) 
 Before  project
1   After project
1   Before project
1   After project
1  





(n = 18) 
158,888 
(156,116) 
(n = 18) 
38,335 
(74,809) 
(n = 65) 
52,856 
(70,038) 





(n = 17) 
194,529 
(117323) 
(n = 17) 
66,513 
(95,992) 
(n = 127) 
86,485 
(115,898) 





(n = 69) 
527,011 
(793,466) 
(n = 69) 
49,440 
(87,664) 
(n = 69) 
59,512 
(84,749) 
(n = 69) 
Fishing equipment  43,422 
(53,878) 
(n = 27) 
147,674 
(167,484) 
(n = 27) 
111,187 
(326,758) 
(n = 41) 
91,589 
(174,255) 






(n = 118) 
1,362,937 
(1,440,951) 
(n = 118) 
17,000 
(28,967) 
(n = 74) 
63,331 
(124,446) 





(n = 31) 
447,900 
(492,751) 
(n = 31) 
16,964 
(34,555) 
(n = 49) 
41,385 
(97,515) 
(n = 49) 
Building structures  139,903 
(624,995) 
(n = 31) 
512,419 
(1,018,658) 
(n = 31) 
92,504 
(203,157) 
(n = 50) 
119,024 
(232,709) 
(n = 50) 
Notes: Number in brackets is standard deviation of the corresponding mean. 
Production equipment = ox plow, oxen, tractor 
Transport equipment = bicycle, wheelbarrow, pickup truck, motorcycle, other means of transport 
Processing equipment = honey equipment, milling machine, refrigerator, other processing equipment 
Fishing equipment = fishing gear, canoe, fishing engine 
Water and irrigation equipment = water pump, borehole, tube well 
Livestock equipment = cattle pen, cattle trough 
Building equipment = storage, fishpond 
1 “Before project” is one year before Fadama II started, October 2004 to September 2005, and “After project” is one year after the 
project started, October 2005 to September 2006. 
An interesting question to explore is how these productive assets are managed and how their 
benefits are shared among group members. This raises the need to study further the efficiency of 
collective ownership of productive assets and how the poor among FUG members benefit from such 
productive assets. Issues to investigate include the economic viability, maintenance, management, and 
operational efficiency of the productive assets. Among the benefits of studying jointly owned productive 
assets are a greater understanding of the returns to productive assets and how they affect productivity of 
labor and other resources, and increased knowledge of methods for targeting poor and vulnerable groups 
and how they benefit from productive assets. Our study was conducted at the household level and did not 
capture these aspects for jointly owned productive assets. However, we did investigate the impacts of 
participation in Fadama II on household incomes, which reflects the impacts of acquisition and use of 
both group and individual productive assets, as well other components of the project such as the effects of 
rural infrastructure investments and agricultural advisory services. 
Another interesting question to explore is the sustainability of the Fadama II success story beyond 
the project period and how it can be replicated to other communities that did not benefit from the project. 
The major constraint faced by poor households is their ability to finance acquisition of high-value assets 
without some form of support from projects or credit services. Fadama II did not involve credit service 
providers because of the high interest they charge and their limited availability. Thus, alternative sources   21
of credit were used by the 14 percent of beneficiaries who had access to credit services (Table 6). 
Relatives, social clubs, and friends were reported to be the major sources of credit for Fadama 
beneficiaries as well as nonbeneficiaries within and outside Fadama II communities. This finding 
underscores the limited options that poor beneficiaries faced to pay for their 30 percent contribution to 
productive assets. 
It is not clear how the poor were able to pay their contributions and if they were able to manage 
assets efficiently.
18 Those who could not secure the necessary funds may have used other forms of 
financing through wealthier friends or relatives (see Table 6). For example, an eligible but poor 
beneficiary could have entered into a rental agreement whereby an ineligible rich person paid the 
beneficiary’s contribution and then asked the beneficiary to pay a premium for a specified period, or to 
share use of the productive asset or part of the returns. In some cases, an ineligible person could own the 
productive asset after paying the contribution of all beneficiaries and then rent the productive asset back 
to the beneficiaries. For example, a woman in one FUG reported that she entered into a rental agreement 
with a wealthy man who paid her beneficiary contribution for a milling machine. Such arrangements 
could affect the targeting of the poorest.  
The World Bank supervision mission of February 2007 noted that most of the subprojects for 
women and vulnerable groups had not been implemented because women and vulnerable groups could 
not pay their contributions (Anonymous, 2007a, 2007b). The mission also noted that most of the 
processing equipment acquired by women was operated by hired hands who benefited more than the 
project beneficiaries and thus recommended the beneficiary contribution for women and vulnerable 
groups be reduced to 10 percent. Initially, the project set the contribution of beneficiaries of the pilot asset 
acquisition project at 40 percent of the value of the productive asset (NFDO, 2005) but reduced it to 30 
percent because of overwhelming evidence of the failure of the poor to pay their share. Even the 30 
percent contribution might be high for expensive productive assets and force FUG members who are 
unable to pay their contribution to turn to more wealthy individuals for credit support or to enter into 
rental arrangements like that previously discussed. Planning for the next phase of the project (Fadama III) 
needs to consider the use of sustainable financing for targeted groups—for example, through 
microfinancing institutions. Existing local rotating savings and credit schemes such as esusu, dashi, and 
adashi could help to increase credit access (Bascom, 1952; Bouman, 1995; Okonjo, 1979). 
                                                      
18 It is still too early to tell how FUGs managed and benefited from their productive assets. However, the medium-term 
review report concluded that the capacity to manage some productive assets was low and there was still need for building the 
capacity of FUGs to manage their assets efficiently (Anonymous, 2007a).   22
Table 6. Access to credit in 2005–2006. 
Nonbeneficiaries  Type of access  FII 
beneficiaries 
(n = 621) 
Within FII LGAs 
(n = 568) 
Outside FII 
LGAs 
(n = 539) 
Total Test 














































































































Notes: FII = Fadama II; LGA = local government area. Figures in brackets are standard deviations. 
a Difference between Fadama II beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries living in the same community is significant at the 5% level. 
b Difference between Fadama II beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries living outside Fadama II community is significant at the 5% 
level. 
c Difference between nonbeneficiaries living in and those living outside a Fadama II community is significant at the 5% level. 
d NACRDB = Nigerian Agricultural Cooperative and Rural Development Bank. 
5.3. Impact of Fadama II on Household Income  
Figure 4 shows that the average annual household income after Fadama II started (2005–2006) for all 
types of respondents ranged from Naira 43,298 to 108,625 (in year 2003 real value).
19 This is above the 
average rural household income of Naira 42,644 reported by the 2003–2004 living standard survey (FOS, 
2004) but within the same order of magnitude. On average, the real incomes of Fadama II beneficiaries 
increased 58.5 percent as a result of participation in the project, based on the PSM and double-difference 
estimation (ATT); that is well above the target of a 20 percent increase that Fadama II set to achieve for 
50 percent of beneficiaries after six years of operation. By contrast, average real incomes of all 
nonbeneficiaries increased only 15.5 percent and even less (12.7 percent) among nonbeneficiaries outside 
Fadama II communities (12.7%)
20. The mean increase in income for beneficiaries was significantly 
                                                      
 
20 The percentage change of the nonbeneficiaries before and after the project are not reported in the Table but are calculated using 
the following simple formula (symbols are as defined in equation 3): 
np1 np0
np0
Y -  Y
*100
Y
   23
different from that for nonbeneficiaries at p = .05. Considering the income of beneficiaries before and 
after the project (without controlling for other reasons for income to change), about 42 percent of 
beneficiaries increased their incomes by at least 20 percent in the first year of Fadama II operation (Table 
7). By contrast, the share of nonbeneficiaries who increased their incomes by at least 20 percent was only 
34 percent. Although that percentage includes the effects of other factors that influence income changes 
over time, it is clear that Fadama II achieved considerable success in its first year of operation.  
We also examined the spillover effects of the Fadama II project by comparing the changes in 
income of Fadama II beneficiaries with those of nonbeneficiaries living within and outside communities 
with Fadama II projects (Figures 4 and 5). The results show no significant difference between the income 
changes of Fadama II beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries living in the same community. These results 
suggest that nonbeneficiaries in Fadama II communities may have benefited from spillover of the project. 
For example, nonbeneficiaries used roads, culverts, and other public facilities funded by Fadama II. 
Nonbeneficiaries could also benefit from services offered by beneficiaries. For example, beneficiaries 
who acquired milling machines could offer milling services and employment to nonbeneficiaries.
21 
It is likely that the impact of the project on incomes will be larger in the future because of lagged 
effects of investments in productive assets, infrastructure, and other project investments. Even without 
longer-term lags, the impacts on incomes in 2005–2006 could be expected to be less than proportionate to 
the increase in productive assets from September 2005 (at the beginning of project implementation) to 
September 2006 (the date for measuring changes in productive assets after implementation of the project), 
because many of the investments in productive assets occurring between September 2005 and September 
2006 may not have come soon enough to affect agricultural production and income during the 2005–2006 
production year. We would expect the full effects of productive assets acquired by September 2006 only 
to begin to be felt during the 2006–2007 production year. Future research on the impacts of Fadama II is 
needed to more fully assess income changes resulting from the project. 
The effect of Fadama II varied across the three major agro-ecological zones of Nigeria (Table 8). 
The project had a significant impact (at p = .10) in the dry savannah zone, where participation in the 
project led to an average increase in income of 79 percent. In the humid forest and moist savannah zones, 
the changes in net income resulting from participation in the project were positive but smaller than in the 
dry savannah and not statistically significant. The large net increase in income in the dry savannah zone, 
where limited rainfall is a major problem, could be explained by the acquisition of irrigation facilities and 
water equipment, which address a major production constraint in that zone. 
A comparison of men versus women beneficiaries showed no significant difference in income 
before or after the project. This could be due to the special preference that Fadama II gives to women 
whose incomes are usually lower than those of men. By targeting women, Fadama II may have enabled 
women to catch up with men in terms of income. As was the case with value of productive assets, the 
income change for female beneficiaries was significantly greater than the income change for female 
nonbeneficiaries. That was expected given the significant change in the value of productive assets for 
female nonbeneficiaries (see Table 4). We also found that the project significantly increased income for 
male beneficiaries relative to male nonbeneficiaries, with a higher estimated percentage ATT for men 
than women. 
Concerning the effects of Fadama II on the three asset terciles, only the Fadama II beneficiaries in 
the second tercile increased their incomes significantly more (at p = .05) than the nonbeneficiaries in that 
tercile. That finding indicates that the project had a less immediate impact on poverty reduction among 
the poorest households. However, the magnitude of the estimated impact on incomes of the poorest asset 
tercile is large (45 percent, although it is statistically insignificant, reflecting a high variance of this 
estimate.
22 Still, the incomes of the poorest asset tercile appear to have been affected less than those of the 
                                                      
21 See Section 5.4 for details on other benefits that nonbeneficiaries received. 
22 The lack of statistical significance of impacts in the estimation subsamples was partly caused by reduced sample size, 
which reduces statistical power, and does not necessarily mean that Fadama II had no impact in those cases. A larger survey 
sample would have been required to identify impacts in such subgroupings with statistical confidence.   24
second tercile, possibly because of the initial investments that the poor had to make to participate in the 
project. Such investments could have crowded out short-term investments for the poorest, most liquidity-
constrained households that could have otherwise increased income in the first year of participation. It is 
likely that beneficiaries in the poorest tercile will see their incomes increase significantly after starting to 
benefit from their investments in productive assets, which, as discussed in the previous section, increased 
significantly. 
In summary, the Fadama II project has caused beneficiaries to realize significant increases in 
income. Using the PSM and double-difference methods, our results allowed us, with considerable 
confidence, to attribute the income increases among beneficiaries to participation in the project. However, 
the impact of Fadama II was different across agro-ecological zones and asset groups. The impact of 
Fadama II on income was not statistically significant in the humid forests and moist savannah zones and 
across gender, although increases in mean incomes of Fadama II beneficiaries were estimated in all cases. 
Beneficiaries in the lowest and highest asset terciles also did not realize statistically significant different 
income growth because of participation in the project (although the estimated mean impact was large and 
positive for the poorest asset tercile). The impacts of the project are not fully captured by this study 
because the project had operated for only one full year when the survey was done; thus, our results do not 
capture the lagged impacts of productive assets, rural infrastructure, and other project interventions. 
However, the study has collected a good baseline that could be used to conduct follow-up studies to 
capture the longer-term impacts of the project.  
























Income before FII  Income after FII
 
Notes: FII = Fadama II; LGA = local government area. “Income before FII” is income one year before Fadama II started, October 
2004 to September 2005, and “Income after FII” is income one year after the project started, October 2005 to September 
2006.The ATT and the corresponding percentage refer to the change in income resulting from participation in Fadama II 
compared with the corresponding group of nonbeneficiaries. Thus, it should not be interpreted as the change in income of the 
corresponding control group of nonbeneficiaries.    25













ATT ('000 Naira) % change of income due to participation in FII
 
Notes: FII = Fadama II; LGA = local government area. The ATT and the corresponding percentage refer to the change in income 
resulting from participation in Fadama II compared with the corresponding group of nonbeneficiaries. Thus, it should not be 
interpreted as the change in income of the corresponding control group of nonbeneficiaries.  
Table 7. Achievement of target increase in income among Fadama II beneficiaries 




20% and below  20–50%  >50% 
Fadama II beneficiaries  57.9  11.9  30.1 
All nonbeneficiaries  66.2  12.6  21.1 
Nonbeneficiaries within FII LGAs  65.1  15.5  19.4 
Nonbeneficiaries outside FII LGAs  67.5  9.2  23.2 
1 “Before project” is one year before Fadama II started, October 2004 to September 2005, and “After project” is one year after the 
project started, October 2005 to September 2006.    26
Table 8. Impact of Fadama II on household income across agro-ecological zones, genders, and asset 
terciles 
Treatment type  Net real annual income (Naira/household)  ATT






   Before project
1 After project
1      
Agro-ecological zones        
Humid forest zone            
FII beneficiaries (n = 176)  87,431 (292102)  112,626 (299102)





Moist savannah zone         
FII beneficiaries (n = 118)  70,578 (203342) 74,295 (280596)






Dry savannah zone          
FII beneficiaries (n = 205)  79,113 (255967) 124,458 (225341) 







Genders (only Fadama II beneficiaries)          
Male (n = 311)   83,691 (280998) 107,454 (282103)





Gender (women only)          
FII beneficiaries (n = 198)  74,326 (217819)   110,383 (239400) 





Gender (men only)     
FII beneficiaries (n = 674)  83,701 (281080)  107,495 (282132) 





Asset terciles        
Tercile 1 (the poorest)     
FII beneficiaries (n = 293)  70,851 (154438)  82,745 (153922)







Tercile 2:          
FII beneficiaries (n = 93)  93,847 (161254)  119,013 (175283)







Tercile 3             
FII beneficiaries (n = 96)  122,074 (239037)  154,892 (267235) 





       
Notes: FII = Fadama II. Numbers in brackets are standard deviations of the corresponding mean. 
1 ATT = (Yp1-Yp0) - (Ynp1-Ynp0). “Before project” is one year before Fadama II started, October 2004 to September 2005, and 
“After project” is one year after the project started, October 2005 to September 2006. 
2 “ATT” and the corresponding “%” refer to the change in productive assets resulting from participation in Fadama II compared 
with the corresponding group of nonbeneficiaries. Thus, they should not be interpreted as referring to the change in the 
productive assets of the corresponding control group of nonbeneficiaries. 
3 % net change due to participation in project = (ATT/Yp0)*100  
* Significant at the 10% level; 
** significant at the 5% level; 
*** significant at the 1% level 
Fadama II targeted the poor and vulnerable groups like women, youth, the elderly, people with 
HIV/IADS, and the physically challenged. Holding other factors constant, this targeting is likely to reduce 
income inequality. In addition to comparing the value of productive assets and income across gender and   27
asset terciles, we further analyzed the achievement of this targeting by examining the change in 
consumption inequality over the first year of the project. We computed the Gini coefficient using 
consumption expenditure instead of income, because the coefficient could be greater than 1 if income 
were negative (Berrebi and Silber, 1985; Chen et al., 1982; Stich, 1996). The results show that the Gini 
coefficient of Fadama II beneficiaries decreased by 9 percent, suggesting that the project contributed to 
reduction of consumption inequality (Table 9). This is consistent with the results of our productive asset 
analysis, which showed that the value of productive assets increased more significantly among the poorest 
asset tercile than among the middle and upper terciles. 
Table 9. Impact of Fadama II on consumption distribution 
Treatment type  Gini coefficient before 
project started 
Gini coefficient after 
project started 
% Gini coefficient 
change 
FII beneficiaries  0.408  0.370  –9.3 








0.316 0.331  4.8 
Note: FII = Fadama II; LGA = local government area. 
1 “Before project” is one year before Fadama II started, October 2004 to September 2005, and “After project” is one year after the 
project started, October 2005 to September 2006. 
5.4. Impact of Fadama II on Rural Infrastructure Development 
5.4.1. Overview 
This section discusses project activities in creating access to road infrastructure; the effect of those 
activities on access to transportation services; the uses, benefits, and problems associated with Fadama II 
roads as well as other rural roads in the study area; and the role of the project in commercialization and 
nonfarm activities. The discussion includes methodological issues and challenges, especially when they 
are a relevant qualifier of the empirical results. Moreover, this section suggests feasible ways to overcome 
methodological and data challenges and offer a deeper analysis. 
This study focuses on rural roads, rather than on all rural infrastructure supported by the project, 
for two primary reasons. First, rural roads are the most common type of rural infrastructure investment 
financed by the project. As discussed later, the available data did not enable us to differentiate individuals 
who were members of an FUG/FCA and received each type of rural infrastructure investment from 
individuals who participated in Fadama II in general. To minimize the inaccuracy of defining the 
treatment group, we focused on the type of infrastructure that is relatively prevalent across participating 
households. Second, the alternative of considering an index of rural infrastructure investments—for 
example, combining market stalls and roads with boreholes—would make it more difficult to trace and 
explore the different pathways through which different types of infrastructure may have an impact.  
5.4.2. Sources of Funding for Roads and the Spillover Effect of Fadama II 
We begin by detailing some basic characteristics and descriptive statistics of the Fadama II–financed rural 
roads. Figure 6 shows the composition of sources of funding for roads reported by the households as 
being important for pursuing their productive activities. Most of these roads are supported by resources 
from state government funds, local governments, the Fadama II project, and the federal government. The 
largest percentage of road investments is financed by state governments. Fadama II funds 21 percent of 
the road investments reported by respondents.   28
Figure 6. Funding sources for roads 
Acronyms 
FII Fadama  II 
ADP Agricultural  development 
programs 
COM Community 
FG Federal  government 
IND Individual 
LEEMP  Local Empowerment and 
Environmental Management 
Program 




PTF  Petroleum Trust Fund 
























Multiple Multiple  sources 
An examination of the three treatment types of respondents citing a Fadama II road as useful for 
their productive activities reveals tentative but interesting evidence of strong and immediate spillover 
from the infrastructure provision aspect of the project. Table 10 shows that a substantial share of 
nonbeneficiaries use Fadama II roads in carrying out income-earning activities, especially 
nonbeneficiaries in Fadama II LGAs.  
Table 10. Respondents stating a Fadama II road is important for their productive activities 
Treatment type 
% stating FII road 
important 
FII beneficiaries  42.0 
Nonbeneficiaries within FII LGAs  15.1 
Nonbeneficiaries outside FII LGAs  7.8 
Total 22.0 
Note: FII = Fadama II; LGA = local government area. 
Given that the particular intervention of interest here is the provision of a local public good 
(rather than a private productive asset or service), our finding is to some extent what we expected, unless 
the project had an effectively enforced policy limiting the use of a public good to project beneficiaries. 
However, while some spillover was expected, the magnitude is notable: 15 percent of nonbeneficiaries in 
Fadama II LGAs and 8 percent of nonbeneficiaries outside Fadama II LGAs reported using Fadama II 
roads for their productive activities. 
Although spillover is a project strength, it poses analytical challenges in identifying the impact of 
public infrastructure investments. Unlike the situation for private goods, productive assets, and services, 
for infrastructure investments it becomes difficult to differentiate between a “treated” and an “untreated” 
person. The direct spillover effect suggests that the impact of the project may be underestimated when 
people formally identified as nonbeneficiaries are considered members of the control group. This point is 
discussed further in a later discussion about estimating the impact of the road investments. 
The stronger “public good” nature of the infrastructure component of Fadama II, compared with 
the small-scale components of assets and advisory services, also has important implications for the 
appropriate provision, financing, and maintenance of the infrastructure, especially in terms of project 
sustainability. Important factors in determining the financing and maintenance options that should be   29
considered for the roads already built under the project are the number and coverage of the direct users. 
Here the term direct user refers to individuals, traders, and others who are actually traveling on a Fadama 
II road, as opposed to those benefiting from its existence in more indirect ways. User fees and the 
introduction of tolls are usually practicable only on major roads traversing larger geographic areas, which 
would not apply well in the context of the communities in the project area. If the majority of direct users 
are within a limited geographical area—for example, a community that is a subset of an LGA—then 
contributions could be sought from the community in kind, in labor, and in cash to complement public 
financing of maintenance costs (e.g., through the local government). Existing community-level 
institutions could facilitate the coordination and collection of contributions. The justification for local 
government involvement emerges from benefits that extend beyond the community—for example, sellers 
in a market profiting when potential buyers living close to the road gain better access to the market.  
5.4.3. Time Dimension of Fadama II Roads 
Table 11 highlights another caveat to keep in mind when discussing the estimated impact of the rural 
infrastructure component of Fadama II. The table shows the reported year in which Fadama II roads were 
built or rehabilitated, as captured through the household survey. It should be mentioned at this stage that 
improved data cleaning—that is, reexamination of the questionnaires and the data entries—are necessary 
to address what appears to be a significant degree of error in the data, because more than 12 percent of the 
Fadama II roads are stated to have been constructed before the project began.  
Table 11. Reported year in which Fadama II roads were constructed or rehabilitated. 
Roads 
Year reported by respondents  Number Percent 
Between 1960 and 2004  65  12.3 
2005 106  20.0 
2006 234  44.2 
N/A 125  23.6 
Total 530  100 
N/A = Not applicable (i.e., farmers did not report having road). 
Further, the table is a reminder that Fadama II roads had been accessible to the surveyed 
households only a year or less before the survey was conducted, with most roads available in 2006, mere 
months before the time for which the potential outcomes were measured. Perhaps even more than the 
spillover effect, this very short time span between provision of infrastructure and measurement of 
outcome limits the possibility of determining the extent to which households may materially benefit from 
this project component. It would therefore be critical to improve on this analysis in the future by obtaining 
additional data from the same households after sufficient time had elapsed for the development of 
mechanisms through which road infrastructure might improve well-being. 
To strengthen confidence in the descriptive picture of the source of funds for various roads, it 
would be valuable to analyze Fadama II project data showing which FCAs have demanded and received 
roads and which FCAs have not, including information that would enable the researcher to match the 
surveyed beneficiaries with the FCAs from the project data. This would also allow for more in-depth and 
relevant analysis of other features concerning access to and benefits from rural infrastructure projects.  
5.4.4. Access to Roads 
Table 12 presents one type of evidence on the extent to which there have been changes in access to road 
infrastructure in the study areas. Individuals were asked to report the distance in kilometers between their 
residence and the nearest all-weather road for two periods: just before September 2005 (when Fadama II   30
was implemented) and one year later, in September 2006.
23 We see that very few households in both the 
project and nonproject communities reported some change. In only 5 percent to 6 percent of cases did the 
distance to the nearest all-weather road change. 
Table 12 Respondents reporting changes in distances to all-weather roads 
Total respondents  FII beneficiaries 
Nonbeneficiaries 
within FII LGAs 
Nonbeneficiaries 
outside FII LGAs  Change in 
distance  Number  Percent  Number Percent  Number  Percent Number  Percent 
               
Decreased  102 2.69  43 3.35  35  2.83 24  1.92 
Increased  109 2.87  34 2.65  23  1.86 52  4.16 
No  change  2,717 71.65  937 73.09  938  75.95 835  66.85 
N/A 864  22.78  268  20.9  239  19.35  338  27.06 
Total  3,792  100.00  1,282 100.00  1,235  100.00 1,249  100.00 
Note: FII = Fadama II; LGA = local government area; N/A = Not applicable (i.e., farmers did not report having road).  
However, for 23 percent of individuals, distance changes could not be determined because of 
nonreporting at one or both points in time. Also, in interpreting these figures, it is useful to keep in mind 
that the time between the reported periods was very short. That fact is particularly relevant for larger 
investments such as roads (as opposed to productive assets or other services) for which procurement, 
planning, and construction procedures are time consuming.  
Another notable finding in the empirical results is the nearly even split between respondents 
reporting that roads are now closer to their homes and those reporting increased distances. Although the 
survey included a question to ascertain the reasons for any changes in distance, unfortunately collection of 
these data was poor,
24 making further analysis of particularly the increased distances impossible. Data on 
the reasons for distance changes would shed light on the causes of worsened access. 
Figures 7a and 7b show the frequency distribution of the distance to all-weather roads for the 
three treatment types and the two periods. The figures show, not surprisingly in light of the overall limited 
changes in distances to roads over time, that the distribution of respondents in the various distance 
categories did not change much from 2005 to 2006. Most households were within 1 km of an all-weather 
road, with the numbers declining with greater distance until about 9 km. Beyond that, the distribution is 
relatively scattered. Figure 7a shows that all three treatment types have similar distributions of distances 
to roads.  
 
                                                      
23 We focus on distance to all-weather roads because the Fadama II project seeks to increase year-round road access. 
24 The major problem was missing data on the reasons for change in distance.    31































FII beneficiaries Nonbeneficiaries within FII LGAs
Nonbeneficiaries Outside FII LGAs
 
Note: FII = Fadama II; LGA = local government area. 
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Note: FII = Fadama II; LGA = local government area.   32
The average distances to town for the treatment groups in each period are shown in Figures 8a 
and 8b. As expected, the distribution suggests greater distances to town than to the nearest all-weather 
road. However, we found that the number of households in each distance category declined as distances 
increased until about 9 km, with the distribution beyond 9 km from town following less of a pattern.  


















































FII beneficiaries Nonbeneficiaries within FII LGAs Nonbeneficiaries outside FII LGAs  
Note: FII = Fadama II; LGA = local government area. 
In assessing the impact of public infrastructure provision through the project, we used the PSM 
approach combined with double-difference estimation, as already discussed in Section 4.5. Commonly in 
program evaluation, there are trade-offs in determining which households will be used for the comparison 
(control) group. The trade-offs are particularly prevalent in cases with more differentiated, treatment type 
stratification—for example, when data are available in three strata: (1) treated individuals, (2) untreated 
individuals in communities selected for intervention, and (2) untreated households in untreated 
communities—as in the context of our survey.    33


















































FII beneficiaries Nonbeneficiaries within FII LGAs Nonbeneficiaries outside FII LGAs  
Note: FII = Fadama II; LGA = local government area. 
On the one hand, using category 2 as the control group avoids the project placement bias inherent 
in some nonrandomized interventions, because the same communities are involved in both groups. 
Although community placement is mitigated in choosing control households from within category 2, the 
potential for self-selection bias is greater because individuals’ choosing to participate rests heavily on 
their own initiative and ability to be willing to organize into small groups, submit a proposal to the 
project, come up with matching funds, and so forth—factors that may also influence outcomes. On the 
other hand, identifying category 3 as the control group mitigates self-selection bias but accentuates 
project placement bias. As discussed in Section 4.5, we addressed the latter concern by using the double-
difference estimator, which nets out the effects of fixed differences between project and nonproject 
locations. 
Given that our approach addresses project placement bias and the potential for greater selection 
bias in CDD projects as opposed to other types of interventions, the case for using category 3 as the 
control group is relatively strong. In the evaluation of public infrastructure, a further element comes into 
play when determining which households to include in the control group. As shown in Table 10, the 
potential for spillover effects is particularly pronounced. That is, nonproject households near or within the 
same community as the project households are much more likely to benefit from infrastructure provision, 
because infrastructure assets are not privately held or used. Therefore, category 2 is much less likely to be 
an unaffected control group for the assessment of the impact of public infrastructure than it is for 
interventions providing private goods and services.  
Because of the nature of the CDD mechanism underlying participation, the nature of the estimator 
used, and the likelihood of spillover effects from provision of public infrastructure as just discussed, for 
this analysis we consider only category 3 as the control group. It is important to note, however, that the 
contamination effect is thereby only reduced, not eliminated, as suggested from the share of households in 
nonproject LGAs that reported making use of Fadama II roads. 
Just as important as a reasoned definition of the control group is the definition of the treatment 
group. The literature on project evaluation primarily analyzes interventions that either focus on only one   34
activity or analyze projects that are multifaceted interventions and are evaluated in terms of all 
components’ comprehensive effects on social and economic outcomes of interest. Of greater challenge are 
cases, as in this evaluation, in which the impact of a subcomponent (here, provision of rural 
infrastructure) is of interest. A precise definition of the treatment group in such a context would 
categorize individuals as “treated” only if they were part of an FUG or FCA that requested and received 
infrastructure investments through the project. This information could be obtained by linking Fadama II 
administrative and project management data to the household survey data, as well as by linking the user 
group and individual survey data. Such information would likely contribute to a more precise pinpointing 
of effects that arise specifically from infrastructure investments. With just the household survey data, 
however, we are limited to considering as the treatment group all households participating in Fadama II, 
whether or not they are part of a user group that received resources for investing in roads. Especially for 
outcomes (to be discussed later) that are more directly linked to road investments (as opposed to the other 
Fadama II interventions such as private productive asset provision or advisory services), the broader-than-
ideal definition of who is in the treatment group may bias some of the results downward. 
Finally, the original intent of the evaluation of rural infrastructure under Fadama II was to 
incorporate information on the costs of these investments alongside the potential benefits, enabling us to 
determine under which circumstances the returns to rural infrastructure investments are highest. Project 
evaluation that considers both costs and outcomes (as opposed to only outcomes) offers even more 
policy- and project-relevant recommendations for improving the efficiency of project investments. It is 
hoped that, through inclusion of project data, this assessment can be incorporated and thus be made useful 
as guidance in the course of implementation of Fadama II. 
With these caveats expressed, we proceed to the results of the PSM and double-difference 
estimation of the effect of Fadama II treatment on various measures of access to infrastructure. In Table 
13, the double-difference estimates show the change over time of the outcome variable among the treated 
respondents, after netting out the same change in the control respondents.  
Table 13. Project impact on access to road infrastructure. 
Outcome variable  Treated  Control  ATT  Std. Err
1  p value 
Change in mean distance to road 
(km) 3.501  4.087  –0.585    4.687  0.901 
Change in mean distance to town 
(km)  –0.202 1.026 –1.227 
** 0.569 0.031 
Change in mean travel time by 
motor vehicle (minutes)  –2.211  0.208  –2.418 
*** 0.913 0.008 
1 Bootstrapped standard errors.  
* Significant at the 10% level; 
** significant at the 5% level; 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
 
The impact of the project on access to roads is assessed using three measures. As shown in Table 
13, in all three cases, the sign of the estimate suggests that access to road infrastructure improved as a 
result of the Fadama II project: the distance to the nearest all-weather road, the distance to town, and the 
time it takes to travel to the nearest road by motor vehicle was reduced. These results are statistically 
significant (at the 5 percent level) for two of the three measures.  
5.4.5. Transportation Services  
In addition to access to infrastructure, which is a more immediate outcome of constructing and 
rehabilitating roads, these interventions could also usher in public and private transportation—for 
example, by making it more profitable as well as feasible to supply transportation services on roads that 
were previously either nonexistent or not easily traversed by vehicles. Therefore, it is also useful to 
explore how the provision of transportation services may have changed over time in the study area.    35
We explored two dimensions of transportation. First, Table 14 reports the average length of time 
individuals waited for motor vehicles. We found that as a result of Fadama II, the waiting time for vehicle 
transportation fell by 11 percent on average, with the improvement in transportation availability more 
than twice as large in the LGAs in which the Fadama II project was operating. Further, we found the 
percentage change in wait time was similar for Fadama II beneficiaries as for nonbeneficiaries in Fadama 
II LGAs, suggesting spillover effects of infrastructure investment on access to transportation services.  
Table 14. Average time waiting for motor vehicle transportation. 
Average wait time 
(minutes)  Treatment type 
  2005  2006 
% change 
FII beneficiaries  17.12  14.90  –13.0% 
Nonbeneficiaries within FII LGAs  20.54  17.65  –14.1% 
Nonbeneficiaries outside FII LGAs  15.89  14.93  –6.0% 
Total 17.86  15.82  –11.4% 
Note: FII = Fadama II; LGA = local government area. 
The second aspect of transportation services considered is the cost of such services. This is 
particularly relevant when, before project intervention, both all-weather roads were within some reach of 
a given individual and transportation services existed. With either additional roads or improved road 
quality, one would expect that the reduced cost of operating motor vehicles would translate into reduced 
costs faced by the users of transportation services (for transporting either people or goods). This issue is 
investigated in Table 15, with average transportation costs disaggregated by treatment type and period. As 
the table shows, costs increased for beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries alike. However, the increase is 
lower, in the case of transportation costs for both people and products, for the beneficiary households. 
Nonbeneficiaries in project LGAs faced lower cost increases than nonbeneficiaries outside project LGAs 
but higher than households directly participating in the project. 
Table 15. Transportation costs (in Naira). 
Cost of transporting  
one load on pickup truck 
Fare to nearest  
urban area by motor vehicle 
Treatment type  2005 2006  %  change  2005  2006 
% 
change 
FII beneficiaries  2,012  2,192  9%  103  106  3% 
Nonbeneficiaries within FII LGAs  2,066  2,276  10%  106  123  16% 
Nonbeneficiaries outside FII 
LGAs 2,147  2,589  21%  103  132  27% 
Total 2,073  2,345  13%  104  120  15% 
Note: FII = Fadama II; LGA = local government area. 
These findings provide tentative evidence that by providing infrastructure, Fadama II may have 
contributed to reducing transportation costs (or more accurately, to mitigating their increase). Table 16 
presents the matching estimation results for the impact of the project on transportation services. We found 
that the provision of roads resulted in improved access to transportation services, in terms of both quantity 
and costs. These findings are statistically significant for two of the three indicators of transportation 










Table 16. Project effect on transportation services. 
Outcome variable  Treated Control  ATT  Std.  Err.
1 p value 
Change in mean time waiting for 
transportation (minutes)  –1.728 0.471  –2.200
** 0.758  0.004 
Change in mean cost of 
transporting load on truck  162.621 190.071  –27.450  58.032  0.636 
Change in mean fare to nearest 
urban area  5.198 11.160  –5.962
* 3.455  0.084 
1 Bootstrapped standard errors.
 
* Significant at the 10% level; 
** significant at the 1% level. 
 
It is worth noting that the cost data, as well as all other price and monetary value data in this 
discussion, are nominal. Therefore, some component of the cost increases observed in Table 15 emanated 
from general inflation. However, we corrected for that in the double-difference estimation, because all 
general time trends, including inflation, were removed from influencing the ATT (i.e., to the extent that 
general inflation affected treatment and control groups equally, its effects were netted out). 
5.4.6. Uses, Benefits, and Problems of Road Infrastructure 
Improved access to roads and greater availability and affordability of transportation services are the direct 
and immediate ways in which the expansion of the rural infrastructure networks can benefit households. It 
is of interest, however, to assess how roads are actually being used and both the benefits and the 
drawbacks reported by the individuals using them.  
Figures 9a and 9b show the self-reported primary uses of roads that respondents accessed. 
Considering both project-supported and other roads, Figure 9a shows that, among the uses associated with 
productive activities, the transport of agricultural inputs is the single largest use, followed by the transport 
of agricultural outputs. A smaller share of individuals consider being able to transport “people” (e.g., to 
get themselves to places of employment) the main use of the roads, and a similarly small share mention 
the improved ability to access their farmland (presumably, these are farmers who reside in urban areas or 
other rural areas but who farm in fadama areas). Nearly half of the cases either did not report uses or 
reported uses not directly associated with productive activities. Because the survey only inquired about 
“productive” activities, no information is available on those cases. It is possible that those individuals 
travel to access health and education services, which were not directly referred to as productive but may 
still impact productivity in the medium to long term.  
Figure 9a. Use of all-weather roads 
   37
Figure 9b. Use of Fadama II roads 
 
* “Other” uses include uses considered not productive and cases with no reported uses. 
The same analysis limited to Fadama II roads is offered in Figure 9b. The figure shows that the 
extent of use to access farmland and to transport people is similar to the overall average. What is striking, 
however, is that the percentage of individuals using Fadama II roads for agricultural input and output 
transportation was much larger than was the case for all roads. Overall, the use of roads for productive 
purposes was larger by about 26 percentage points. This is consistent with the project’s goal of improving 
access to public infrastructure and thereby improve production and marketing activities. 
Interestingly, there is partial contrast between the reported uses of roads and the reported benefits 
from roads. For example, Figure 10 shows that the share of households reporting easier transportation of 
products as the main benefit was greater among users of all roads than among users of Fadama II roads. 
The reverse is seen with respect to access to farmland, although a slightly smaller percentage of 
individuals used Fadama II roads for accessing farms than used roads in general for that purpose (see also 
Figures 9a and 9b).  
Considering the reported problems with roads, Figure 11 shows that the problem of accidents 
seems to have been relatively more prevalent on all roads than on Fadama II roads. Overall, this is by far 
the most frequently noted concern. Notable is the relatively higher rate of reporting of air pollution as a 
problem resulting from construction of Fadama II roads, although in absolute terms this is not a 
frequently reported problem. An interesting finding is that most of the stated problems are noneconomic 
in nature (i.e., accidents, social vices, air pollution). Only a few individuals cited as an economically 
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5.4.7. Infrastructure and Marketing 
A substantial body of literature on the impact of road infrastructure investments in developing countries 
suggests that one of the main contributions of infrastructure development to economic growth operates 
through its ability to facilitate market access and marketing of agricultural products, thus fostering a 
structural move from subsistence-based agriculture to increased commercialization.  
In light of this hypothesis, we examined the extent to which commercialization of agriculture may 
have changed over time for households and LGAs receiving Fadama II support compared with those not 
directly supported by the project. Figures 12a through 12d offer a summary of our findings for four 
commodity groups. The bar charts, the scale for which is located on the left of each graph, show the share 
of agricultural production sold on the market in 2004–2005 and 2005–2006. The line chart summarizes 
this information by representing the percentage change over time in the share marketed, with the scale 
indicated on the right side of each graph.   40
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Note: FII = Fadama II; LGA = local government area. 
For example, the share of grain sold on the market increased from 37.8 percent to 39.4 percent for 
Fadama II households, which represents a 4 percent change in this share We observed that the marketed 
share increased in the one-year period for all four commodity groups and for all treatment types, with 
increases of between 5 percent and 10 percent seen for grains, roots, and vegetables. For fish products, the 
increase was much more dramatic, averaging about 34 percent. Interestingly, the rise in the marketed 
share is highest for the nonparticipating LGAs and is again most pronounced in fish marketing. These 
findings raise the question, Are the process by which LGAs were selected for participation inversely 
correlated with community characteristics that also drive the potential for increased commercialization? It 
appears that the FII project targeted areas that were less prone to commercialization (probably 
unintentionally).    41
Further exploration of this question would necessitate more careful analysis of LGA (as opposed 
to only household) characteristics. However, this report is based solely on analysis of the household 
survey; the survey of economic interest groups that the evaluation team received could not be analyzed by 
LGA given missing identifier variables. It is hoped that this information can be supplemented, permitting 
a further examination of LGA-level factors that could be conditioning the empirical findings on marketing 
represented in Figures 12a through 12d.  
Table 17 presents the corresponding ATT, controlling for household-level characteristics. Here 
we see, not inconsistent with the descriptive graphs, a negative effect across all commodity groups, with 
significant results for three of the four commodity types. To rule out the possibility that these results were 
the consequence of a failure to control for LGA-level characteristics, it is critical to be able to incorporate 
such data, and therefore these results should be considered preliminary until the community data can be 
made available and incorporated into the analysis. 
Table 17. Project effect on agricultural marketed share 
Outcome variable  Treated  Control  ATT  Std. Err.
1 p-value 
Change in mean share of grain 
marketed 1.142  3.379  –2.237
*  1.210 0.065 
Change in mean share of root crops 
marketed 0.833  2.904  –2.072
  2.091 0.322 
Change in mean share of vegetables 
marketed 2.438  9.342  –6.904
***  2.100 0.001 
Change in mean share of fish 
marketed  2.007 11.742  –9.734
 ***  3.312 0.003 
1 Bootstrapped standard errors. 
* Significant at the 10% level; 
** significant at the 5% level; 
*** significant at the 1% level.
 
5.4.8. Nonfarm Economic Activities  
Finally, we consider the effect that road provision through the project had on nonfarm activities. 
Expanding the road network could affect both agricultural productivity and agricultural income, as well as 
open up avenues to other activities—for example, by facilitating access to employment opportunities 
outside the farm as well as establishing rural microenterprises. However, as Table 18 shows, there is no 
evidence of statistically significant effects of the Fadama II project on nonfarm activities, as measured by 
changes in the level of nonfarm income or in participation in nonfarm activities (proxied by a dummy 
variable on whether nonfarm income was earned). In contrast to all other outcome variables previously 
considered, expansion of nonfarm economic activities and diversification are changes that occur 
particularly slowly, even after improved access to roads and transportation has been established. Change 
occurs slowly because it often requires a structural shift in a household’s activity choices, entails costs 
related to a potentially long search for employment, and involves (in the case of establishing 
microenterprises outside the farm) new investments by households to launch the business. Given the short 
time span of this study, the lack of effects found should be viewed in light of this caution. 
Table 18. Nonfarm economic activities 
Outcome variable  Treated  Control  ATT  Std. Err.  p value 
Change in mean nonfarm 
income (Naira  53,654  126,531  –72,877  109,721  0.507 
Change in mean of whether 
nonfarm income earned 
(dummy) –0.026  –0.052  0.026  0.022  0.231   42
6.  IMPACT OF FADAMA II ON ADVISORY SERVICES 
6.1. Overview 
Agricultural extension approaches and performance in Nigeria have been changing over the past few 
decades (Oladele et al., 2004). These changes have been driven by many factors, including the political 
and policy changes, donors, and recently by participation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in 
funding and providing agricultural extension services (Oladele et al., 2004; Ozor et al., 2007). Currently, 
advisory services in Nigeria are largely provided by an agricultural development program (ADP) that 
evolved from a project funded by the World Bank. The World Bank project started in 1974 and had a 
broad objective of increasing food production to attain food self-sufficiency (IEG, 2001; Oladele et al., 
2004). When the project ended in 1995 with significant success in increasing agricultural production, the 
federal government adopted its approach and incorporated it into the new ADP. Operations of the ADP 
are mainly funded by the federal and state governments, and provision of advisory services remains in the 
hands of public extension workers (Oladele et al., 2004). The ADP has continued to use the traditional 
supply-driven approach and has also been characterized by poor funding and less effective advisory 
services (Ozor et al., 2007). These weaknesses have likely limited the impacts of the ADP on agricultural 
productivity in the country and rural development in general. 
The NGOs and projects have also been providing advisory services and other agriculture-related 
services (e.g., credit services and agricultural input supply). The approaches of the advisory services 
provided by NGOs and projects have differed, reflecting different focuses and locations in the country. 
Although the government has allowed and supported NGOs and projects, it has not yet taken bold steps to 
promote pluralistic advisory services. However, the presence of NGOs and projects has created 
opportunities for introducing demand-driven advisory services funded by nonpublic sources. Fadama II is 
one of the projects providing demand-driven advisory services. The project has also introduced the user-
fee approach that could help in promoting pluralistic extension services in developing countries (Umali-
Deininger, 1997). Fadama II beneficiaries contribute 10 percent of the cost of the advisory services they 
receive. The experience of the Fadama II project in implementing a user-fee demand-driven approach is 
likely to serve as a good case study for the government to use to design policies for implementing 
pluralistic extension services in Nigeria and other developing countries. In the following section, we 
discuss the performance of the Fadama II project in providing demand-driven extension services and how 
that has affected provision of production, processing, financial management, and marketing advisory 
services.  
6.2. Impact of Fadama II on the Types of Technologies Adopted and Demanded 
Table 19 shows that the technology used by a large percentage of respondents to our survey was 
improved crop varieties, which about one-quarter of the respondents used. Another one-quarter of 
Fadama II beneficiaries also used financial management technologies, probably due to that being one of 
the conditions for joining the project. The technology that was demanded by the largest share of 
respondents differed across types of respondents. Fadama II beneficiaries asked for postharvest 
technologies more than did nonbeneficiaries. The difference in demand for postharvest technologies was 
significant at p = .10. This could be a reflection of the beneficiaries demand to make use of the productive 
assets they acquired through the pilot asset acquisition subproject. Surprisingly, nonbeneficiaries 
demanded financial management technologies more than did beneficiaries. This could be a result of 
having facilitators who “supply” beneficiaries with financial management technologies, preempting the 
need to ask for such technologies. There was no significant difference between adoption and demand for 
crop-improved varieties. Nonbeneficiaries’ demand for soil fertility management was significantly higher 
(at p = .05) than that of beneficiaries. Only 4 percent of beneficiaries demanded soil fertility management 
technologies compared with 10 percent of nonbeneficiaries. That reflects the limited emphasis of the   43
Fadama II project on soil fertility technologies. However, the Fadama II project addressed the need to 
address soil fertility problems by launching the agricultural input support component in 2006 (NFDO, 
2006).  
Fadama II beneficiaries also used significantly more livestock management, postharvest handling, 
financial management, and agricultural marketing than did nonbeneficiaries. The results suggest that 
Fadama II support may have given the beneficiaries incentives to use new technologies and may have 
contributed to the higher income that beneficiaries realized.  
Table 19. Adoption and demand for production, postharvest, financial management, and marketing 
technologies 
Technology  Proportion reporting using the technology  Proportion reporting asking for the technology 
 Fadama  II 
beneficiaries 
(n = 621) 
All 
nonbeneficiaries  









      
Crop-improved 
varieties 

























0.082 (0.011)  0.061 (0.007)  0.103*  0.271 (0.054)  0.160 (0.041)  0.098* 
Financial 
management 
0.246 (0.017)  0.061 (0.007)  0.000***  0.013 (0.009)  0.069 (0.030)  0.022** 
Agricultural 
marketing 
0.098 (0.012)  0.072 (0.008)  0.059*  0.016 (0.016)  0.059 (0.026)  0.199 
Notes: Figures in parenthesis are standard errors. Statistics are computed using matched sample only.  
* Significant at the 10% level; 
** significant at the 5% level; 
*** significant at the 1% level 
 
Table 20 shows that the ADP is the major provider of production technologies (improved crop 
varieties, soil fertility management, and livestock production) for both beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries. 
The ADP’s focus on providing mainly agricultural production technologies is similar to the pattern of 
public extension services observed in other developing countries (Qamar, 2005). However, it is 
interesting to note that the State Fadama Development Office (SFDO) was the source of production 
technologies for about 30 percent of the beneficiary respondents who adopted those technologies.   44
Table 20. Sources of advisory services by type of production technology 
Proportion of respondents
1  Technology and sources of 
information on it  Fadama II 
beneficiaries 
All nonbeneficiaries  T-test (p value) 
Crop-improved varieties  n = 149  n = 277   
ADP  0.49 (0.03)  0.55 (0.04)  0.271 
Individual  0.05 (0 .02)  0.07 ( 0.02)  0.448 
FUG/FCA  0.10 (0.03)  0.08 ( 0.02)  0.463 
Farmer association  0.03 (0.02)  0.01 ( 0.01)  0.043** 
Radio/TV  0.11 (0.03)  0.04 (0 .01)  0.011*** 
SFDO
2/facilitators  0.31 ( 0.04)  0.04 ( 0.01)  0.000*** 
MANR
3  0.01 (0 .01)  0.04 ( 0.01)  0.065* 
Others  0.08 (0.02)  0.08 ( 0.02)  0.892 
Soil fertility management   n = 79  n = 133   
ADP  0.59 (0.06)  0.78 (0.04)  0.002*** 
Individual  0.08 (0.03)  0.07 (0.02)  0.897 
FUG/FCA  0.13 ( 0.04)  0.07 (0.02)  0.128 
Farmer association  0.05 ( 0.03)  0.03 (0.02)  0.509 
Radio/TV  0.03 ( 0.02)  0.04 (0.02)  0.574 
SFDO
2/facilitators  0.36 ( 0.05)  0.01 (0.01)  0.000*** 
MANR
3  0.01 (0.01)  0.04 (0.02)  0.261 
Others  0.10 ( 0.03)  0.09 (0.03)  0.902 
Livestock management practices   n = 128  n = 172   
ADP  0.40 (0.04)  0.52 ( 0.04)  0.040** 
Individual  0.06 ( 0.02)  0.19 (0.03)  0.002*** 
FUG/FCA  0.12 (0.03)  0.07 ( 0.02)  0.143 
Farmer association  0.05 (0.02)  0.04 (0.01)  0.574 
Radio/TV  0.02 (0.01)  0.03 (0.01)  0.470 
SFDO
2/facilitators  0.32 (0.04)  0.09 (0.02)  0.000*** 
MANR
3  0.04 ( 0.02)  0.17 ( 0.03)  0.000*** 
Others  0.08 (0.02)  0.13 ( 0.03)  0.074* 
Note:   Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. 
* Significant at the 10% level; 
** significant at the 5% level; 
*** significant at the 1% level 
 
1 Refers to only those respondents who adopted the technology and based on matched sample only 
2 State Fadama Development Office 
3 Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (state-level ministry) 
The sources of postharvest, marketing, and financial management advisory services are mainly 
NGOs and projects for both Fadama II beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries (Table 21). As expected, SFDO 
is the major source of information for postharvest, financial management, and marketing advisory 
services for Fadama II beneficiaries. This demonstrates the orientation that the Fadama II project has 
taken to support postharvest, financial management, and marketing technologies, which Fadama I did not 
provide. Surprisingly, SFDO also provided postharvest, financial management and marketing 
technologies to nonbeneficiaries. However, the share of nonbeneficiaries who received advisory services 
on those technologies from SFDO was lower than the share of nonbeneficiaries who received the 
corresponding technologies from ADP. The results suggest that there is a spillover effect of the Fadama II 
project to nonbeneficiaries through the advisory services. This implies that free riding is occurring, 
because Fadama II beneficiaries contribute 10 percent of the costs of advisory services, whereas 
nonbeneficiaries presumably do not contribute. The results have implications on the user-fee arrangement 
that Fadama II uses. Collection of user fees from non–Fadama II households could be difficult because 
they may not be in organized groups and may not have any form of contract that could facilitate collection 
of user fees. Additionally, some advisory services are provided using mass media, which makes it   45
difficult to collect fees from those who benefit from such services. Even though Ozor et al. (2007) 
observed that most farmers expressed willingness to pay for advisory services, payment of user fees by 
poor farmers who produce low-value crops is a major problem in low-income countries (Qamar, 2005), 
and 100 percent public funding of advisory services for such farmers may still remain the only viable 
option.  
It is also interesting to note that farmer groups and individual farmers are among the important 
providers of some advisory services. For example, 25 percent of nonbeneficiaries received agricultural 
marketing advisory services from fellow farmers. This demonstrates the important role that farmers play 
in providing advisory services. Radio and TV also play an important role in providing some advisory 
services. Fadama II has used radio and TV programs to promote various technologies. Radio is an 
especially important tool for disseminating advice on agricultural technologies (Nwaerondu and 
Thompson, 1987). Radio communication is becoming increasingly important in rural areas where 
ownership of private FM radios continues to spread. The major challenge for the use of the mass media is 
to ensure that programs are accessible to all listeners by using local languages in rural areas. Some 
SFDOs, such as Lagos, Ogun, and the states in the dry savannah zone, are using local languages in the 
projects financed by Fadama II.  
In summary, Fadama II has focused on providing postharvest handling, agricultural marketing, 
and financial management advisory services. However, it is only for postharvest advisory services that the 
beneficiaries have significantly greater demand compared with nonbeneficiaries (at p = .10). On the other 
hand, nonbeneficiaries reported significantly greater demand for soil fertility management technologies 
and financial advisory services than did beneficiaries (at p = .05). It is not clear why nonbeneficiaries 
expressed higher demand for soil fertility management technologies than did beneficiaries. It is possible 
that areas where nonbeneficiaries grow crops are degraded more, because they reported a greater 
proportion of marketed surplus than beneficiaries (see Section 5.4). The possible explanation for the latter 
result is that financial advisory services were provided to Fadama II beneficiaries through the capacity-
building component, which initially used a supply-driven approach to help beneficiaries to initiate their 
economic activities on a commercial basis. The results underline the greater demand for postproduction 
advisory services (especially on postharvest handling) and suggest the need to increase the provision of 
the processing, storage, marketing, and financial advisory services. Those services are important for 
implementing the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy framework, which aims 
to reduce poverty by transforming subsistence agriculture to commercial agriculture (NNPC, 2004).  
The Fadama II project has had limited impact on provision of production advisory services. On 
the other hand, the public extension service provider (the ADP) has focused on providing production 
advisory services using mainly a supply-driven approach. Thus, the two projects appear to be 
complementing each other but use different approaches. The country has used several extension 
approaches promulgated by donors and projects (Oladele et al., 2004). As it strives to reform its extension 
systems toward more pluralistic systems, the government needs to harmonize existing approaches and 
seek to use those that are complementary rather than conflicting (Oladele et al., 2004). Complementary 
approaches will certainly increase the effectiveness of the advisory services. For example, the Fadama II 
project has already gained experience in providing demand-driven nonproduction technologies 
(postharvest, marketing, and processing technologies), while the ADP has long-standing experience in 
providing production technologies.   46
Table 21. Sources of postharvest handling, business/financial management, and marketing advisory 
services 
Proportion of respondents
1  Technology/source of information 
Fadama II 
beneficiaries 
All nonbeneficiaries  T-test (p value) 
Postharvest handling  n = 50  n = 66   
ADP  0.41 ( 0.07)  0.68 (0 .05)  0.001*** 
Individual  0.04 (0.03)  0.17 (0.05)  0.023** 
FUG/FCA  0.04 ( 0.03)  0.07 (0.03)  0.446 
Farmer association  0.02 (0.02)  0.00 (0.00)  0.249 
Radio/TV  0.02 (0.02)  0.03 ( 0.02)  0.738 
SFDO
2/facilitators  0.70 ( 0.05)  0.13 (0 .04)  0.000*** 
Others  0.04 (0.03)  0.10 (0 .04)  0.1964 
Business/financial management  n = 155  n = 66   
ADP
  0.12 (0.02)  0.28 (0.04)  0.0003*** 
Individual  0.01 (0.01)  0.09 (0.03)  0.0013*** 
FUG/FCA  0.07 (0 .02)  0.04 (0.01)  0.3084 
Farmer association  0.01 (0.01)  0.02 (0.01)  0.3309 
Radio/TV  0.01 (0 .01)  0.02 (0.01)  0.3309 
SFDO
2/facilitators  0.68 (0.04)  0.07 (0.02)  0.0000*** 
MANR
3  0.00 (0.00)  0.01 (0.01)  0.2145 
Others  0.03 (0.01)  0.08 (0.03)  0.0267** 
Agricultural marketing  n = 62
   n = 77   
ADP
  0.19 (0 .05)  0 .3 ( 0.05)  0.1360 
Individual  0.06 (0 .03)  0 .25 (0.05)  0.0032*** 
FUG/FCA  0.11 (0.04)  0.09 (0.03)  0.6175 
Farmer association  0.03 (0.02)  0.00 (0.00)  0.1043* 
Radio/TV  0.00 (0.00)  0.09 (0.03)  0.0177** 
SFDO
2/facilitators  0.62 (0.06)  0.11 (0.04)  0.0000*** 
Others  0.03 (0.02)  0.12 (0.04)  0.0578* 
Note:   Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. 
* Significant at the 10% level; 
** significant at the 5% level; 
*** significant at the 1% level 
 
1 Refers to only those respondents who adopted the technology and based on matched sample only 
2 State Fadama Development Office 
3 Ministry of Agricultural and Natural Resources (state level).. 
However, technologies that require expensive investments with long-term pay-offs (e.g., soil and 
water conservation structures) may have low demand (Qamar, 2005); therefore, they may need to use the 
ADP supply-driven approach initially. It is also important for Fadama II to invest in providing advisory 
services on production technologies, because the ADP has limited funding to effectively provide such 
services. Provision of production advisory services will increase the returns from the large investment that 
Fadama II beneficiaries make when they acquire productive assets. For example, providing advisory 
services on fish farming could help to increase productivity of the new enterprise.   47
7.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In its first year of operation, the Fadama II project realized significant positive impacts on households’ 
access to markets, transportation services, and productive assets, and to household income and of asset 
acquisition. Using propensity score matching and double-difference methods to control for project 
placement and self-selection biases, we found that Fadama II reduced beneficiaries’ distance and travel 
time to the nearest town and reduced the waiting time and fares for transportation services, relative to 
nonbeneficiary households in Fadama II LGAs. Household access to productive assets increased 
dramatically, especially for the poorest households, largely because of the subsidy provided to help 
finance acquisition of such assets. Household incomes improved substantially more for Fadama II 
beneficiaries than for nonbeneficiaries, with an average increase in real income resulting from 
participation in Fadama II of about 60 percent, well above the target of at least 20 percent increase in 
income that Fadama II set to achieve in six years for 50 percent of the beneficiaries. About 42 percent of 
beneficiaries increased their incomes by at least 20 percent within one year of Fadama II implementation, 
indicating that the project nearly succeeded in achieving its income goal within its first year of 
operation.
25  
Comparison of the income impacts of the project across asset terciles showed that the project did 
not have a statistically significant impact on income among the poorest tercile (although the estimated 
coefficient was positive), despite the large and significant impacts on productive assets reportedly 
available to the poor. However, the project may have a much bigger impact among the poorest 
beneficiaries in the future because of the lagged effect of productive asset acquisition. Thus, a follow-up 
study is needed to capture the longer-term effects of productive assets and other changes that farmers 
experienced as a result of participating in the Fadama II project. 
The project also had more-limited impacts on income in the humid forest and moist savannah 
zones than in the dry savannah zone. That could be a result of the irrigation investments that beneficiaries 
in the moist savannah zone demanded over other types of productive assets to address the erratic rainfall 
in the area. Irrigation investments have a larger impact on agricultural productivity in moisture-stressed 
areas than in more-humid areas. 
The income impacts of the project are likely to be higher in the future because the beneficiaries 
acquired productive assets that are likely to increase their incomes significantly. Further, it is likely to 
take some time to generate the full impacts on income from investments in infrastructure, possibly by 
leading to changes in household livelihood strategies (e.g., increased nonfarm activities) and 
commercialization. The estimated effects on changes in these variables were either insignificant (in the 
case of nonfarm income) or counterintuitive (in the case of commercialization). Further research is 
needed to assess these types of broader and longer-term impacts, after the project has had sufficient time 
for the impacts to be realized. This study was conducted at an early stage of the project and does not 
capture its lagged impacts, especially the long-term benefits of productive asset acquisition and rural 
infrastructure development. 
The impact of the Fadama II project on productive asset acquisition is large and statistically 
significant across all agro-ecological zones, asset terciles, and genders. However, the change in the value 
of productive assets caused by participation in Fadama II was larger and more significant for jointly 
owned productive assets. This reflects the policy that the project used to implement the pilot asset 
acquisition component. The dramatic increase in the value of productive assets resulting from 
participation in the project was mainly caused by the cash transfer from the 70 percent matching funds 
that the project provides to Fadama User Groups. The large cash transfer used to implement this project 
raises the important question of whether this success story can be replicated.  
Three major issues that need to be addressed in scaling up this success story are better targeting 
of poor and vulnerable groups, finding sustainable methods of promoting development of rural financial 
                                                      
25 However, as noted earlier, the increase does not control for the influence of other factors that could have contributed to an 
increase in beneficiary income.   48
services, and increasing the capacity of fadama resource users to manage productive assets efficiently. 
These three issues are interrelated and therefore need to be considered simultaneously.  
Over the first year that the project operated, the Gini coefficient of consumption expenditure for 
the beneficiaries decreased by about 9 percent compared with an increase of 2 percent for 
nonbeneficiaries. This suggests that the project contributed to reduction of consumption expenditure 
inequality, probably through targeting poor and vulnerable groups. Consistent with this, Fadama II also 
succeeded in raising the value of productive assets of the poorest asset tercile more significantly than for 
the other asset terciles. Even though the large increase of value of productive assets suggests that the 
project succeeded in targeting the poor, analysis of income showed a limited impact of the project on 
income among the poorer beneficiaries, as previously noted. The weak impact of the project on income of 
poorer households could be a result of the low capacity of the poor to use and manage the new productive 
assets. It is also possible that the poor borrowed money from well-off individuals who in turn asked them 
to pay high premiums or required other agreements that lowered their income returns.  
This raises the need to help the poor to access affordable credit services. The supervision mission 
and the external medium-term evaluation recommended further reduction of the beneficiary contribution 
to 10 percent for women and the vulnerable (Anonymous, 2007a). Even though this recommendation 
addresses the short-term objective, it is not likely that the approach will be sustainable after the project 
ends. The long-term solution for the failure of the poor to pay for productive assets is affordable rural 
credit services. Fadama II did not involve credit service providers to help beneficiaries to pay for their 
contribution. There is need to involve credit service providers by helping them to offer credit at 
competitive interest rates to the poor using collateral substitutes such as group repayment incentives. For 
example, the project could help to strengthen the provision of credit services in rural areas by using strong 
rural associations, as done by the Grameen Bank. The project could also help to foster credit 
intermediaries or to promote rotating savings and credit associations that can help the poor to access 
productive assets.  
Addressing the low capacity of the poor and vulnerable to manage productive assets efficiently 
also calls for increased training and development of complementary services, such as advisory services. 
One of the components of Fadama II is provision of demand-driven advisory services. The project 
increased the demand for postharvest handling technologies but did not have a significant impact on the 
demand for financial management and marketing information. Fadama II reduced the demand for soil 
fertility management technologies, perhaps because of its emphasis on providing postproduction advisory 
services. As the project plans its third phase, it should consider supporting soil fertility management to 
enhance the effectiveness of productive assets and other interventions and to address the potential land 
degradation that could result from higher agricultural productivity. 
Overall, the Fadama II project has achieved its goal of increasing the incomes of the beneficiaries 
in the first year of its operation. The project has also succeeded in targeting the poor and vulnerable in its 
productive-asset component, even though that did not appear to increase significantly short-term 
household incomes among the poorest asset tercile. The unique feature that could have contributed to the 
significant impact of the project in a short time is its broad-based approach, which addresses the major 
constraints limiting the success of CDD projects that address only one or two constraints. This has 
implications on planning poverty reduction efforts in low-income countries. Given that the poor face 
numerous constraints, a CDD project that simultaneously addresses many constraints will likely build 
synergies that will lead to larger impacts than will a project that addresses only one or two constraints. 
This suggests the need for the government and donors to pool resources and initiate multipronged CDD 
projects rather than many isolated projects.    49
APPENDIX:  PROBIT REGRESSIONS OF FADAMA II PARTICIPATION  
(MATCHED OBSERVATIONS) 
Fadama II beneficiaries compared with: 
Explanatory variables  All nonbeneficiaries 
Nonbeneficiaries within 
Fadama II LGAs 
Nonbeneficiaries outside 












(1 = female, 0 = male)  0.531***  (0.09)  0.592***  (0.11)  0.549***  (0.12) 
Household  size  0.021***  (0.01) 0.021** (0.01) 0.023** (0.01) 
Age of respondent 
(years) -0.001  (0.00)  0.010**  (0.01)  -0.013***  (0.01) 
Level of education of 
respondent (years of 
formal education)  0.001 (0.01) 0.007 (0.01) -0.005 (0.01) 
Area of rainfed land 
(ha)
1  0.000*  0.00  0.000  (0.00) 0.000*** (0.00) 
Agro-ecological zone (compared with humid forest)       
   Moist savannah   -0.067  (0.12)  -0.205  (0.14)  -0.088  (0.16) 
   Dry savannah   -0.039  (0.11)  -0.06  (0.12)  -0.121  (0.13) 
Distance to all-weather 
road (km)
1  0.000 0.00 0.000  (0.000)  0.005***  (0.00) 
Value of productive 
assets
1  (Naira)  -0.000  0.00  -0.00 (0.000) -0.00  (0.00) 
Value of livestock 
assets
1 (Naira)  0  0.00  0 (0.000) 0  (0.00) 
Constant  -0.660*** (0.23) -0.773*** (0.27)  0.332  (0.30) 
Sample size (n)  966  697  614  
R
2  0.037  0.048  0.097  
Prob>χ
2  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  
Log  likelihood  -606.16  -459.91  -379.97  
1 Quantities reported for the period before the project started. 
* Significant at the 10% level; 
** significant at the 5% level; 
*** significant at the 1% level.   50
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